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THE LEGAL ETHICS OF REAL EVIDENCE: OF CHILD 
PORN ON THE CHOIRMASTER’S COMPUTER AND 
BLOODY KNIVES UNDER THE STAIRS 
Gregory C. Sisk* 
Abstract: With little guidance from the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and 
continuing confusion on professional obligations, questions about engagement with real 
evidence continue to bedevil criminal defense lawyers, incite prosecutors, generate disputes, 
and attract judicial attention. 
Where should we draw that line between what is demanded by the professional duties of 
zealous advocacy and client confidentiality and what constitutes obstruction of justice? When 
may a document or object that could conceivably be relevant in some future investigation or 
proceeding be destroyed, altered, or removed? May a criminal defense lawyer take 
possession of evidence of a crime for purposes of analysis, even if forensic characteristics are 
altered? What should the lawyer do with real evidence afterward? May the lawyer ever retain 
real evidence without being accused of impeding access? May the lawyer return evidence to 
where it was found or to the person who delivered it? What advice should the lawyer give to 
the possessor? And what of the problem of material that may not merely be evidence but also 
may constitute contraband? 
This Article critically examines the law of real evidence under the search light of 
professional responsibility, attorney-client confidentiality, and the constitutional rights of 
criminal defendants. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Do the right thing.” As a directive to a person who knowingly walks 
off the straight and narrow path, the aphorism may well serve as 
encouragement to get back on course. By reminding the actor of the 
highest ideals, she may recover the moral strength to steer away from 
selfish and base pursuits. When a person’s mind is clouded—not by 
uncertainty as to what constitutes “the right” but by temptations of the 
wrong or fear of the temporal consequences for bravely pursuing the 
path of righteousness—this simple adage may clear away the cobwebs. 
But when a person is struggling to map out the just and upright 
course, simply instructing him to “do the right thing” is more likely to 
frustrate than to inspire. When what is “right” is the preeminent 
question, falling back on the lazy platitude to do what is “right” amounts 
to avoidance rather than guidance. Indeed, when the moral path is 
covered by dense undergrowth, telling a person to “do the right thing” is 
about as helpful as answering a driver’s request for directions with Yogi 
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Berra’s tongue-in-cheek advice: “When you come to a fork in the road, 
take it.”1 
And so it is with Rule 3.4(a) of the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct. Rule 3.4(a) forbids a lawyer to “unlawfully obstruct another 
party’s access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a 
document or other material having potential evidentiary value.”2 The 
key word here is “unlawfully,” which appears twice in the sentence. As 
Stephen Gillers observes, this rule “offer[s] no help” and simply “yields 
to the law. If it’s legal, it’s ethical. If not, not.”3 
The criminal defense lawyer must be a zealous advocate, protect the 
client’s right against self-incrimination, and maintain confidentiality in 
representing a client.4 Accordingly, the lawyer is entitled—nay, 
professionally mandated—to prevent others from gaining access to or 
information about the location of documents, objects, or other materials 
that are or were in the possession of the client—unless such efforts 
would amount to “unlawfully obstruct[ing] another party’s access to 
evidence.” 
Moreover, a lawyer may properly counsel a client to dispossess 
herself from documents, objects, or materials that are associated with 
wrongful behavior or that in themselves are wrongfully possessed 
(contraband). But, again, the lawyer’s forward duties to shield the 
client’s affairs from prying eyes and to advise the client regarding 
disposal of effects come to a screeching halt if the conduct would be 
“unlawful.” 
So where then is that legal line with respect to “real evidence”?5 That 
of course remains the crucial query. The Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct buck that question by referring the professional to the 
substantive law of the applicable sovereign, federal or state. And the law 
of evidentiary preservation, especially in the context of federal criminal 
1. YOGI BERRA, WHEN YOU COME TO A FORK IN THE ROAD, TAKE IT!: INSPIRATION AND 
WISDOM FROM ONE OF BASEBALL’S GREATEST HEROES (2001). 
2. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(a) (2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/ 
groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/rule_3_4_ 
fairness_to_opposing_party_counsel.html. 
3. Stephen Gillers, Guns, Fruits, Drugs, and Documents: A Criminal Defense Lawyer’s 
Responsibility for Real Evidence, 63 STAN. L. REV. 813, 818 (2011). 
4. A lawyer’s ethical duties with respect to preservation of and allowing access to evidence 
applies in the civil context as well, through the law of spoliation of evidence and pertinent rules of 
civil procedure. The civil side of the question will be addressed in a separate article tentatively 
titled, “The Not Short and Sweet Story of Zubulake and the Ethics of Spoliation of Evidence.” 
5. On the definition of “real evidence,” see infra notes 25 to 29 and accompanying text. 
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law, is opaque.6 Congress has responded to corporate scandals by 
imposing stricter duties to preserve potential evidence and by 
undermining the traditional defense that an actor behaved wrongfully 
only if he deliberately destroyed evidence while aware that it was 
relevant to likely proceedings.7 And, while some general themes can be 
drawn from judicial opinions, the case law does not address every 
situation and is not readily accessible to the lawyer who must decide 
what to do with potential real evidence under exigent circumstances.8 
The risk-averse lawyer understandably might sail for the safe harbor 
of advising the client to save everything forever and to generously reveal 
everything once an investigation is underway.9 But that lawyer then 
would be deceived. The lawyer’s duties of zealous advocacy and 
confidentiality cannot be so readily surrendered, even if the alternatives 
provoke anxiety.10 Indeed, in an era of growing awareness that law 
enforcement crime labs may lack competent training and rigorous 
scientific standards, criminal defense lawyers may have a duty to 
conduct or arrange for independent forensic testing of real evidence.11 In 
sum, trimming sails and dropping anchor at the dock of law enforcement 
may deprive the client of effective assistance of counsel. 
Two contrasting tales about lawyers responding to what was 
unrecovered evidence in one criminal case and what proved to be 
evidence in a then-unknown criminal investigation in another case 
confirm the dangerous ambiguity in this field of professional ethics. In 
one case, the lawyers opted for revelation when they should not have. In 
the other case, the lawyer opted for destruction with a reasonable basis 
to doubt a criminal investigation would follow, only to be indicted for 
obstruction of justice. 
In The Case of the Child Porn on the Choirmaster’s Computer, 
6. See infra Parts II and III. 
7. See infra Part II. 
8. Gillers, supra note 3, at 816 (saying that “it is impossible to make sense of those authorities,” 
because court “[r]ulings are confusing and inconsistent, ignore constitutional or other rights, impede 
return of stolen property, and endanger the public”). 
9. See Greta Fails, The Boundary Between Zealous Advocacy and Obstruction of Justice After 
Sarbanes-Oxley, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 397, 421 (2012) (warning that the “over-
criminalization of previously innocent conduct” creates “an incentive structure that pits lawyers’ 
interests in self-preservation against their clients’ interests”); Bruce A. Green, The Criminal 
Regulation of Lawyers, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 327, 366 (1998) (noting that “a cautious lawyer might 
derive the lesson that his own interests, if not those of the client, may be best served by avoiding 
conduct that, although lawful, could be misconstrued as an attempt to conceal or destroy 
incriminating material”). 
10. See infra Part II.D and IV.B.1. 
11. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
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leaders in a church parish discovered child pornography on a laptop 
belonging to the longtime choirmaster.12 Having no reason to believe 
that the choirmaster had abused any person at the parish, church leaders 
wanted to avoid any further embarrassment by quietly dismissing him. 
Before taking that step, they sought the advice of legal counsel. Because 
possession of child pornography is illegal, the lawyer advised that the 
hard-drive be destroyed to remove the child pornography. Indeed, the 
lawyer was willing to perform that task for them. Unbeknownst to the 
lawyer and the church leaders, the now-dismissed choirmaster was under 
investigation by federal law enforcement for distribution of child 
pornography (and, indeed, a host of other crimes). When federal 
authorities discovered that the lawyer had destroyed the computer hard-
drive, he was indicted for obstruction of justice. In United States v. 
Russell,13 facing a jail term of 20 years, the lawyer agreed to plead guilty 
to a lesser offense and be placed on probation, rather than maintain a 
defense that he had acted appropriately.14 
In The Case of the Bloody Knife Under the Stairs, a criminal 
defendant charged with murdering his estranged wife revealed to his 
lawyers that he had hidden the knife underneath the basement steps in 
his house.15 In Wemark v. State,16 the police had conducted an extensive 
search of the house, but had not discovered the weapon. After consulting 
a judge and experienced lawyers, the defendant’s counsel concluded 
they were ethically required to reveal the location of the knife by one 
means or another to law enforcement or the prosecution.17 While the 
lawyers convinced themselves that such a disclosure might have other 
strategic advantages for the defendant, their analysis was founded on the 
“faulty premise” that their knowledge of the knife’s location was not 
privileged and they were compelled to reveal it.18 After convincing the 
defendant to tell a prosecution expert where he had hidden the knife, law 
enforcement re-searched the house and found the knife. The knife 
became a prominent exhibit at trial and was used dramatically during the 
prosecutor’s closing argument, after which the jury convicted the 
defendant of first degree murder. 
In one of these cases, the lawyers got the answer wrong—dead 
12. For further discussion of this case, see infra Part III. 
13. 639 F. Supp. 2d 226 (D. Conn. 2007). 
14. See infra Part III.A.6. 
15. See infra Part V. 
16. 602 N.W.2d 810 (Iowa 1999). 
17. For further discussion of the Wemark case, see infra Part V. 
18. Wemark, 602 N.W.2d at 813–17. 
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wrong.19 In the other case, the lawyer acted within what I believe was a 
permissible range of professional discretion even if unwise—but was 
indicted for his troubles.20 In neither case were the lawyers involved 
novices or substandard practitioners; they were well-respected and 
highly successful criminal defense lawyers of the first rank. And yet 
uncertainties about the boundaries of professional conduct persisted. 
The themes advanced and conclusions submitted in this Article are 
three-fold: 
First, the lawyer’s professional duty to the client may require her to 
learn of, examine, and perhaps take possession of real evidence, while 
striving to remain zealously loyal to the client and maintain 
confidentiality in the face of uncertain legal demands.21 In other words, 
the professionally responsible and effective lawyer may not be able to 
avoid engagement with real evidence and the ethical dilemma that may 
attach with that engagement. When making these difficult decisions in 
the present environment of legal uncertainty, criminal defense lawyers 
acting in good faith should be given ample breathing room, without 
facing the prospect of criminal prosecution or disciplinary charges. 
Second, the criminal defense lawyer’s ethical obligation to preserve 
or disclose evidence is not triggered unless a criminal investigation or 
another proceeding is reasonably anticipated in the foreseeable future.22 
That a document or object conceivably may be relevant to a possible 
dispute that could arise at some point in the future should not impose a 
duty to preserve that item or result in the destruction being characterized 
as obstruction of justice or evidence tampering. In advising a client on 
the duty to preserve or the right to destroy, the criminal defense lawyer’s 
professional judgment about whether an investigation or proceeding may 
be reasonably anticipated should ordinarily be respected.23 
Third, while the lawyer (and client) may be prohibited from taking 
certain actions that make discovery of evidence by law enforcement 
substantially more difficult, neither is the lawyer (or client) obliged to 
make such revelation any easier. A lawyer’s engagement with real 
19. See infra Part V.B (discussing Wemark). 
20. See infra Part III.B.3 (discussing Russell). 
21. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
22. See JAMIE S. GORELICK, STEPHEN MARZEN, LAWRENCE SOLUM & ARTHUR BEST, 
DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE § 7.1 (2014) (“The better view . . . is that destruction of evidence is 
unethical and in violation of the prohibition of conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice 
when the evidence is relevant to a reasonably foreseeable or pending legal proceeding, even if the 
destruction does not violate a criminal law.”). 
23. See infra Part III.B.5. 
 
                                                     
09 - Sisk_Final_Reviewed_By_Author.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/9/2014  8:29 PM 
826 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:819 
evidence does not become wrongful just because law enforcement 
subsequently fails to find that evidence in a criminal investigation. In 
particular, a criminal defense lawyer’s right and duty to examine real 
evidence should not be transmuted into a general obligation to then 
deliver it to law enforcement when returning evidence to its original 
location or possessor is possible.24 
I. THE LAWYER’S GENERAL ETHICAL DUTY WITH 
RESPECT TO ACCESS TO EVIDENCE 
The focus of attention in this Article is on what may be described as 
“real evidence,” that is, things or objects. Stephen Gillers uses “the term 
‘real evidence’ interchangeably with ‘object’ and ‘item’ to refer to the 
thing a lawyer may come to possess or learn about.”25 The term “real 
evidence” dates back at least to the classification in Jeremy Bentham’s 
nineteenth century common-law evidence treatise.26 For Bentham, “real 
evidence” was that immediately arising from the nature of things, as 
contrasted with “personal evidence” that is based on the communications 
of human beings.27 Thus, as Sidney Phipson wrote in the Yale Law 
Journal in 1920, Bentham treated the following items as “real evidence” 
in a criminal proceeding: 
Subject-matter of the offense (the person killed or hurt—the 
thing damaged or destroyed—the document or coin fabricated); 
(2) the fruits of the crime (the goods stolen—the money or profit 
obtained); (3) instruments used in committing the crime; (4) 
materials designed to assist in its perpetration; (5) place of 
deposit of the object of the crime; (6) neighboring bodies 
suffering change in consequence of the crime (places spotted 
with blood).28 
To Bentham’s list, we add for present purposes traditionally “personal 
evidence,” such as written records and electronically stored information. 
Importantly, beyond indicating a physical item or document, Gillers 
emphasizes that the word “evidence” “presumes a legal proceeding in 
which the item may be offered as proof.”29 
24. See infra Parts IV.B, C, & D. 
25. Gillers, supra note 3, at 823. 
26. 3 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 26 (1827). 
27. Id. at 34. 
28. Sidney L. Phipson, “Real” Evidence, 29 YALE L.J. 705, 707 (1920). 
29. Gillers, supra note 3, at 823. On when something may be evidence that must be preserved, 
see infra Part II. 
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Rule 3.4(a) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct forbids a 
lawyer to “unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence or 
unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having 
potential evidentiary value.”30 The paragraph further provides that “[a] 
lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to do any such act.”31 
Comments 1 and 2 to Rule 3.4 explain these proscriptions as 
necessary to ensure “[f]air competition in the adversary system” and to 
uphold the important procedural “right of an opposing party, including 
the government, to obtain evidence through discovery or subpoena.”32 
Accordingly, when law enforcement or prosecutorial authorities 
investigating or prosecuting an alleged violation of the law present a 
lawful claim of access to evidence, the lawyer for a client is obliged to 
properly respond to that request and not to unlawfully obstruct access to, 
alter, destroy, or conceal that evidence. 
As a diligent and zealous advocate, the lawyer may and should raise 
plausible objections to requests for discovery and assert non-frivolous 
grounds for quashing a subpoena from law enforcement. The lawyer 
may be justified in raising objections based on the attorney-client 
privilege; the privilege against self-incrimination; constitutional 
limitations on law enforcement intrusion into the attorney-client 
relationship; and court rules, holdings, or other standards limiting the 
issuance of prosecutorial subpoenas to criminal defense lawyers.33 When 
a colorable objection can be made to a request or demand for 
confidential information, the lawyer should raise and competently 
advocate it.34 
But if legal resistance by a lawyer to a request or demand for 
documents or other evidence proves unsuccessful, the lawyer must 
30. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(a) (2013), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_ 
professional_conduct/rule_3_4_fairness_to_opposing_party_counsel.html. 
31. Id. 
32. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(a) cmts. 1 & 2 (2013), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_ 
professional_conduct/rule_3_4_fairness_to_opposing_party_counsel.html. 
33. On government subpoenas to criminal defense counsel, see 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & W. 
WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 9.37, at 9-157 to 9-160 (3d ed. 2013). 
34. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 13 (2013), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_ 
professional_conduct/rule_1_6_confidentiality_of_information/comment_on_rule_1_6.html 
(“Absent informed consent of the client to do otherwise, the lawyer should assert on behalf of the 
client all nonfrivolous claims that [an order to disclose] is not authorized by other law or that the 
information sought is protected against disclosure by the attorney-client privilege or other 
applicable law.”). 
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comply with such lawful requests and may not inappropriately impede 
access to the evidence. 
The crucial modifier in paragraph (a) of Rule 3.4, which appears 
twice in the first sentence, is that the lawyer may not act “unlawfully.” 
Thus, the ethical propriety of the lawyer’s conduct depends largely on 
the lawyer’s identification of and faithful adherence to the underlying 
requirements of the law regarding access to, possession of, and 
preservation of evidence. 
By itself, paragraph (a) of Rule 3.4, even when read in light of the 
accompanying comments, provides little guidance to the lawyer. As 
elucidated below, the underlying legal restrictions on possessing, 
concealing, or destroying actual or potential real evidence are not always 
well-known or fully understood, even by experienced attorneys. Many 
elements of this area of law remain less than crystal clear in application. 
II. WHEN DOES AN ITEM BECOME REAL EVIDENCE? THE 
LAW ON THE DUTY TO PRESERVE 
A. A Summary of State Laws on Obstruction of Justice35 
There is considerable variation among the states on obstruction of 
justice or tampering with evidence.36 Nonetheless, as discussed below, 
the conscious contemplation of an official proceeding or investigation—
and not merely the remote possibility of such—appears to be a nearly 
universal expectation before a person’s destruction or alteration of what 
might have been evidence is regarded as criminal. 
In most states, the prospect of a proceeding or investigation is placed 
at the forefront of the criminal evaluation by focusing on the person’s 
knowledge or belief about the existence or likelihood of an official 
proceeding or investigation.37 For example, state statutes may refer to an 
35. Read literally, obstruction of justice and evidence tampering statutes do not distinguish 
between civil and criminal proceedings. STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF THE LAW PROFESSION 
243 (2009). Thus, deliberate destruction of that which would be evidence in a civil lawsuit 
theoretically could bring criminal charges. As a practical matter, however, destruction of evidence 
in civil litigation tends to be addressed in terms of spoliation and litigation consequences, see supra 
note 4, rather than by criminal prosecution. However, a civil matter may evolve into a criminal 
matter, especially in the white collar context, where a civil administrative proceeding later gives rise 
to a criminal investigation. 
36. On state obstruction of justice statutes, see generally GORELICK, MARZEN, SOLUM & BEST, 
supra note 22, §§ 5.6 to 5.10. 
37. Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Incriminating Evidence—Too Hot to Handle?, CRIM. 
JUST., Summer 2009, at 42, 43 (explaining that most states follow the Model Penal Code approach 
by requiring the person charged with tampering of evidence to have believed an official proceeding 
 
                                                     
 
09 - Sisk_Final_Reviewed_By_Author.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/9/2014  8:29 PM 
2014] LEGAL ETHICS OF REAL EVIDENCE 829 
official proceeding or investigation as “pending or . . . about to be 
instituted”;38 or as “pending or in progress”;39 or may prohibit 
destruction of something that “is about to be produced in evidence upon 
any trial, inquiry, or investigation.”40 Indeed, the Model Penal Code 
prohibits tampering with evidence, which is defined as “alter[ing], 
destroy[ing], conceal[ing] or remov[ing] any record, document or thing 
with purpose to impair its verity or availability” in “an official 
proceeding or investigation” that the person believes “is pending or 
about to be instituted.”41 In these states, then, intentional destruction or 
alteration of evidence is criminal conduct if there is an actual or 
imminent proceeding or at least one that “‘could readily have been 
contemplated’ under the circumstances of the case.”42 
Other state criminal statutes demand proof that the person who 
destroyed or altered evidence acted with the specific intent to impede a 
proceeding or investigation, without referring directly to pendency or 
imminence. For example, an Iowa statute prohibits destroying, altering, 
or concealing evidence that would be admissible in a criminal trial, if 
done “with intent to prevent the apprehension or obstruct the prosecution 
or defense of any person.”43 By classifying such conduct as criminal 
obstruction of justice when done with intent to prevent “apprehension,” 
as well as when designed to obstruct prosecution or defense of a person, 
this statute effectively integrates the anticipation of a future criminal 
investigation or proceeding into the mens rea for the crime. 
A handful of states simply and generally prohibit obstruction of 
justice.44 For example, Maryland states that “[a] person may not, 
by . . . corrupt means, obstruct, impede, or try to obstruct or impede the 
administration of justice in a court of the State.”45 Because this statute 
prohibits acting by “corrupt means,” which the federal courts interpret to 
mean conscious knowledge that one is engaging in wrongdoing,46 these 
was pending or about to be instituted). 
38. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 918.13(1) (2014). 
39. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 37.09(a) (West 2011). 
40. CAL. PENAL CODE § 135 (West 2014). 
41. MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.7(1) (1962). More than a dozen states have statutes directly based 
on the Model Penal Code. GORELICK, MARZEN, SOLUM & BEST, supra note 22, § 5.8. 
42. People v. Mercedes, 756 N.Y.S.2d 735, 738 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2003). 
43. IOWA CODE § 719.3 (2014). 
44. GORELICK, MARZEN, SOLUM & BEST, supra note 22, § 5.7. 
45. MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW § 9-306 (West 2014). 
46. See GORELICK, MARZEN, SOLUM & BEST, supra note 22, § 5.7 (predicting these state statutes 
will be interpreted consistently with traditional federal obstruction of justice statutes). On judicial 
interpretation of “corrupt” to mean conscious knowledge of wrongdoing, see infra Part III.B. 
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statutes place a heavy burden of proof on the prosecution. When there is 
no reasonable prospect of a criminal prosecution at the point in time that 
a document or item is destroyed, proof of “corrupt” motivation becomes 
impossible. Moreover, when construing parallel language in a federal 
statute,47 the courts have held that “administration of justice” means that 
the destruction of evidence must relate to a pending judicial 
proceeding.48 
B. The Traditional Federal Approach to Obstruction of Justice: 
§§ 1503 and 1512 
Federal criminal law regarding preservation of evidence traditionally 
adhered to the expectation that a proceeding must be pending or 
imminent before a duty would arise to preserve physical items or 
documents. The original federal obstruction of justice statute, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1503, sometimes called the Omnibus Clause, generally prohibits 
“corrupt[] . . . endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due 
administration of justice.”49 
This criminal statute has long been interpreted by the Supreme Court 
to apply only when some judicial proceeding, such as a grand jury, is 
actually pending and the defendant had notice of that proceeding; the 
mere existence of a law enforcement investigation or the possibility of a 
future proceeding is insufficient to characterize an individual’s conduct 
as an obstruction of justice under § 1503.50 For a criminal conviction 
under § 1503, “the act must have a relationship in time, causation, or 
logic with the judicial proceedings” and “the endeavor must have the 
‘natural and probable effect’ of interfering with the due administration of 
justice.”51 
47. 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2012) (prohibiting a person from “corruptly” “obstruct[ing], or 
imped[ing]” “the due administration of justice”). 
48. GORELICK, MARZEN, SOLUM & BEST, supra note 22, § 5.3. 
49. 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a). On the Omnibus Clause, see generally Justin Alexander Kasprisin, 
Obstruction of Justice, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 847, 849–65 (2010); Kimberley A. Schaefer & John 
S. Schowengerdt, Obstruction of Justice, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 763, 765–80 (2006); Kyle R. 
Taylor, Note, The Obstruction of Justice Nexus Requirement After Arthur Andersen and Sarbanes-
Oxley, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 401, 406–09 (2008). 
50. United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 598–99 (1995); Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 
197, 206–07 (1893). 
51. Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599. At least one commentator criticizes the second part of this test, 
worrying that obstruction of justice could be proven under § 1503 when the person acted with 
specific intent to engage in the conduct but only negligently with respect to the obstructive effect. 
Julie R. O’Sullivan, The Federal Criminal “Code” Is a Disgrace: Obstruction Statutes as Case 
Study, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 688–89 (2006). By “[s]ubstituting a negligence 
(‘reasonably foreseeable’) standard for a specific intent to obstruct requirement does not make 
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Somewhat more broadly, although ultimately limited by judicial 
construction, another federal obstruction of justice statute, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1512(b), prohibits “corruptly persuad[ing] another person, or 
attemp[ting] to do so,” “with intent to . . . alter, destroy, mutilate, or 
conceal an object with intent to impair the object’s integrity or 
availability for use in an official proceeding.”52 Section 1512 further 
specifies that “an official proceeding need not be pending or about to be 
instituted at the time of the offense.”53 Subsequently, subsection (c) was 
added to § 1512 to clarify that an actor obstructs justice if he or she 
directly performs the obstructive activity rather than encouraging others 
to do so.54 The provision thus extends obstruction of justice to when a 
person “corruptly . . . alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, 
document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair 
the object’s integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding.”55 
In Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States,56 the Supreme Court 
reversed the § 1512 conviction of an accounting firm for having directed 
employees to destroy documents, holding that the statutory requirement 
that the defendant has acted “knowingly” and “corruptly” demanded 
“proof of consciousness of wrongdoing.”57 The Court further rejected 
the government’s argument that the statute required no showing that the 
actor’s encouragement to destroy documents was motivated by the 
anticipation of a proceeding: 
It is . . . one thing to say that a proceeding “need not be pending 
or about to be instituted at the time of the offense,” and quite 
another to say a proceeding need not even be foreseen. A 
“knowingly . . . corrup[t] persuade[r]” cannot be someone who 
persuades others to shred documents under a document retention 
policy when he does not have in contemplation any particular 
sense,” she says, “[s]uch a reading permits the criminal sanction to be applied to all kinds of 
nonculpable conduct.” Id. at 689. The concern is well-taken but should be ameliorated by the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of “corrupt” in obstruction of justice statutes to require proof of 
wrongdoing. See infra notes 56–58 and accompanying text. Either directly or indirectly by nexus 
and proof of conscious wrongdoing requirements, Julie O’Sullivan is quite right that “specific 
intent” for obstruction of justice statutes should be read to mean “that the defendant’s purpose was 
to obstruct justice—that was his special motive for acting.” Id. at 688 (emphasis in original). 
52. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2)(B) (2012). See generally Kasprisin, supra note 49, at 877–79; 
Schaefer & Schowengerdt, supra note 49, at 780–92. 
53. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(f)(1). 
54. Taylor, supra note 49, at 423. 
55. 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1). 
56. 544 U.S. 696 (2005). 
57. Id. at 704–07. 
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official proceeding in which those documents might be 
material.58 
C. Anticipatory Obstruction: Sarbanes-Oxley § 1519 
1. Removing the Direct Link to a Proceeding or Investigation in 
§ 1519 
As part of the Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 
2002, commonly known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,59 Congress enacted 
a new criminal statute demanding preservation of documents and items 
relevant to a federal matter and removing the requirement of a direct 
connection to an actual pending or imminent investigation or judicial 
proceeding: 
Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers 
up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or 
tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence 
the investigation or proper administration of any matter within 
the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States 
or any case filed under title 11 [bankruptcy], or in relation to or 
contemplation of any such matter or case, shall be fined under 
this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.60 
Section 1519 was enacted in the aftermath of corporate financial and 
accounting scandals and designed to make corporate fraud easier to 
detect by preventing destruction of documents and electronic records.61 
To this point, the courts have uniformly turned away the argument that 
§ 1519 is limited to corporate fraud cases, to entities with a pre-existing 
duty to retain records, or only to documents and record-keeping.62 After 
58. Id. at 707–08; see also O’Sullivan, supra note 51, at 706 (lauding the Supreme Court’s 
“insist[ence] that there be consciousness of wrongdoing before a defendant can be convicted” for 
obstruction of justice under § 1512, but pointedly commenting that the fact this “should even have 
been an issue, let alone one that had to be litigated all the way to the Supreme Court, speaks 
volumes about the deficiencies of the federal [criminal] ‘code’”). 
59. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 800 (2002) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012)). 
60. 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012); see generally Christopher R. Chase, To Shred or Not to Shred: 
Document Retention Policies and Federal Obstruction of Justice Statutes, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & 
FIN. L. 721, 741–43 (2003); Donald K. Joseph, Stop the Shredding: Document Retention After U.S. 
v. Andersen, PROF. LAW., 2006 Symposium Issue, at 13; Kasprisin, supra note 49, at 883–87; 
Michael A. Perino, Enron’s Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflections on the Deterrence Aspects of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 671, 680 (2002); Dana E. Hill, Note, 
Anticipatory Obstruction of Justice: Pre-Emptive Document Destruction Under the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Anti-Shredding Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1519, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1519 (2004). 
61. See Fails, supra note 9, at 402. 
62. United States v. Kernell, 667 F.3d 746, 755–56 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Hunt, 526 
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this Article was originally written, the Supreme Court granted certiorari 
in Yates v. United States,63 a case involving a commercial fisherman 
who was convicted under § 1519 for throwing overboard undersized 
grouper fish as obstructing an investigation into catching fish under the 
legal size limit.64 The Supreme Court granted review on the question 
whether § 1519 covers only the destruction of documents and “tangible 
objects” related to record-keeping.65 
For our present purposes in addressing the duty to preserve evidence, 
the most important feature of § 1519 is that it does not directly link the 
forbidden conduct of altering or destroying evidence to the actual 
pendency of an investigation, much less the imminence of an actual 
judicial proceeding. The Senate Report accompanying the 2002 
legislation clarified that § 1519 was designed to eliminate “any technical 
requirement” that “tie[d] . . . obstructive conduct to a pending or 
imminent proceeding or matter.”66 
As Dana Hill has described it, § 1519 prohibits “anticipatory 
obstruction of justice,”67 that is, conduct that occurs before the actors 
know of a specific investigation or proceeding but nonetheless 
undertaken with an intent to obstruct. For that reason, some courts have 
held that a nexus to a specific federal investigation is not a predicate to 
the charge,68 much less that the person destroying or altering evidence 
believed that the actions were likely to succeed in obstructing an 
investigation.69 Nonetheless, to have acted with the specific intent to 
impede or obstruct, “the defendant must have been aware of the pending 
or contemplated matter or investigation.”70 
2. Reasonable Anticipation Integrated into Mens Rea for § 1519 
While “a link between a defendant’s conduct and an imminent or 
F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2008); United States v. Kofoed, No. 8:09CR142, 2009 WL 2781967, at *2 
(D. Neb. Aug. 26, 2009). 
63. 733 F.3d 1059 (11th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 1935 (2014) (No. 13-7451). 
64. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3–4, Yates v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1935 (2014) (No. 13-
7451), 2013 WL 8350082, at *3–4. 
65. Yates, 134 S. Ct. 1935 (2014). When this Article was completed, the Yates case was scheduled 
for oral argument before the Supreme Court on November 5, 2014. 
66. S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 14–15 (2002). 
67. Hill, supra note 60, at 1523. 
68. United States v. Kernell, 667 F.3d 746, 753 (6th Cir. 2012). 
69. United States v. Yielding, 657 F.3d 688, 712 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Gray, 642 F.3d 
371, 377 (3d Cir. 2011). 
70. United States v. Perraud, 672 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1350 (S.D. Fla. 2009). 
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pending official proceeding” may not be a predicate fact that must be 
proven under § 1519,71 reasonable anticipation of an investigation 
presumably has been integrated into the mens rea element. As the Fifth 
Circuit noted, a “plausible” construction that “gives effect to the 
statute’s language as a whole” is to “read[] intent into every clause.”72 
Indeed, the legislative history emphasizes that “the intent required is the 
intent to obstruct, not some level of knowledge.”73 
One cannot intend to obstruct an investigation or act in 
“contemplation”74 of an investigation unless one anticipates an 
investigation. The mere fact that the destruction of a document or object 
has the collateral effect of obstructing a federal investigation or 
administration is not sufficient; the statute expressly requires proving 
that the charged party had the specific intent of causing such obstruction. 
When a criminal investigation is only conceivable but remains entirely 
speculative, destruction of documents or objects that provide evidence of 
criminal wrongdoing should not implicate § 1519.75 
Lest innocent conduct be subject to prosecution, Greta Fails argues 
that § 1519 “should be construed to contain a nexus requirement,” by 
which “[d]efendants need to have foreseen a potential future proceeding 
that their conduct could possibly obstruct to have violated the 
obstruction statutes.”76 Further, construing § 1519 to require proof of 
corrupt intent by the charged defendant will “prevent 
overcriminalization” of conduct that may serve multiple purposes, only 
one of which is the forbidden intent to obstruct an investigation or 
matter.77 
In United States v. Yielding,78 the Eighth Circuit explained that 
§ 1519 would apply not only when the “defendant acts directly” with 
71. Gray, 642 F.3d at 377. 
72. United States v. McRae, 702 F.3d 806, 837 (5th Cir. 2012). 
73. 148 CONG. REC. S7,418–19 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
74. 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012). 
75. Cf. S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 27 (2002) (“[Section 1519] should not cover the destruction of 
documents in the ordinary course of business, even where the individual may have reason to believe 
that the documents may tangentially relate to some future matter within the conceivable jurisdiction 
of an arm of the federal bureaucracy.”). 
76. Fails, supra note 9, at 433; Taylor, supra note 49, at 432 (arguing that the courts should 
continue “the trend toward a broadly applicable nexus requirement”). 
77. United States v. Kernell, 667 F.3d 746, 754 (6th Cir. 2012) (stating that the intent to obstruct 
language in § 1519 “subsumes the [corrupt intent] requirement”); McRae, 702 F.3d at 838 (referring 
to Kernell’s suggestion “that there is ‘no dispute’ that criminal liability under § 1519 requires some 
corrupt intent”). 
78. 657 F.3d 688 (8th Cir. 2011). 
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respect to “a pending matter,” but when a defendant acts “with intent to 
obstruct a foreseeable investigation of a matter within the jurisdiction of 
a federal agency [that] has not yet commenced.”79 As the court 
explained, without a sharp focus on the specific intent to obstruct an 
investigation, § 1519 would reach plainly innocent conduct, such as 
routine destruction of documents.80 In other words, § 1519 does not 
criminalize behavior that purportedly “obstructs” a remotely possible 
investigation.81 Thus, as the Eighth Circuit well stated it, § 1519 by 
applying to acts “in contemplation” of an investigation “refer[s] to a 
matter that was not yet pending but which the defendant envisioned or 
anticipated.”82 
Moreover, § 1519 likely would be unconstitutionally vague, unless 
“construed as requiring proof that defendant acted with specific, 
wrongful intent.”83 Although interpreting a different obstruction of 
justice statute, the Supreme Court’s observation in Arthur Andersen that 
a person cannot intend to obstruct a proceeding that would “not even be 
foreseen”84 remains enlightening in this respect.85 By confining the 
operation of § 1519 to circumstances where the wrongful nature of the 
acts is obvious, and thus where conscious knowledge of wrongdoing by 
the defendant is established directly or indirectly, concerns about 
overbreadth in § 1519 diminish. 
3. Recent Decisions on Anticipation of an Investigation Under § 1519 
In nearly all of the cases decided to date by the federal courts under 
79. Id. at 711. 
80. Id. (stating that without requiring specific intent to obstruct an investigation, “then the statute 
would forbid innocent conduct such as routine destruction of documents that a person consciously 
and in good faith determines are irrelevant to a foreseeable federal matter”).  
81. See McRae, 702 F.3d at 837 (saying the court was “receptive to [defendant’s] well-presented 
argument” that § 1519 might be vague if applied where “[t]he connection between the defendant’s 
conduct and an investigation might be so remote . . . that the statute punishes innocent conduct,” but 
finding it unnecessary to decide where the defendant was on notice that his plainly unlawful conduct 
was criminal).  
82. Yielding, 657 F.3d at 714. 
83. United States v. Stevens, 771 F. Supp. 2d 556, 562 (D. Md. 2011). 
84. Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 707–08 (2005). 
85. United States v. Fumo, Crim. No. 06–31, 2009 WL 1688482, at *54 (E.D. Pa. June 17, 2009) 
(“While section 1519 was authored after the Supreme Court’s decision in Arthur Andersen, that case 
serves as a touchstone for measuring the appropriateness of this Court’s jury instructions regarding 
obstruction claims based upon other statutes.”). But see Yielding, 657 F.3d at 712 (declining to 
extend this reasoning because “the language of § 1519 is materially different” from the statutes 
addressed in earlier Supreme Court cases); United States v. Moyer, 674 F.3d 192, 209 (3d Cir. 
2012) (same). 
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§ 1519, an investigation either was ongoing or was obviously 
anticipated: 
First, in many cases, the person charged with obstruction under 
§ 1519 knew of an investigation when the evidence was destroyed, thus 
leaving nothing to the imagination about the intent to obstruct the 
investigation.86 
For example, in United States v. Wortman,87 after being interviewed 
by FBI agents about her boyfriend’s interest in child pornography and 
hearing them warn her boyfriend not to tamper with or destroy any 
compact discs that he had loaned to another, the defendant went to the 
location, took a disc containing child pornography downloaded by her 
boyfriend, and broke it.88 The Seventh Circuit majority affirmed the 
guilty verdict, readily rejecting her argument that she could not have 
formed the requisite intent to obstruct the FBI investigation because the 
focus was on her boyfriend and he took the lead in planning to destroy 
it.89 Even so, a dissenting judge argued that the defendant could not be 
convicted on the evidence presented, which showed that she acted “in 
the heat of the moment” rather than to impede an FBI investigation and 
was merely used by her boyfriend, “in much the same way as he might 
have used a hammer” to achieve his goal of destroying evidence.90 More 
pointedly, and persuasively, the dissent describes the case as “a poor 
exercise of [the government’s] vast prosecutorial discretion,”91 a 
characterization that also applies to the illustrative case discussed in Part 
III.92 
Second, in other cases, a party falsified required reports about an 
incident, plainly wishing others to rely on a false story.93 When a party 
86. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 655 F.3d 594, 599, 602 (7th Cir. 2011) (upholding 
conviction under § 1519 and other statutes where defendant responded to federal agents attempting 
to execute a warrant to search for illegal drugs by locking the door to the house during which agents 
heard toilets flushing and saw defendant at the kitchen sink washing dishes); United States v. Hicks, 
438 F. App’x 216, 217–18 (4th Cir. 2011) (upholding conviction where defendant, after learning 
federal agents wanted to speak to him about child pornography, destroyed his computer hard-drive). 
87. 488 F.3d 752 (7th Cir. 2007). 
88. Id. at 753–54. 
89. Id. at 754–55. 
90. Id. at 755–56. 
91. Id. at 755. 
92. See infra Part III.B.5. 
93. See, e.g., United States v. McQueen, 727 F.3d 1144, 1151 (11th Cir. 2013) (upholding 
conviction of corrections officer for preparing false reports hiding acts of violence involving 
inmates, often incited by the corrections officers); United States v. Yielding, 657 F.3d 688, 716 (8th 
Cir. 2011) (describing evidence that defendant knew about the hospital’s investigation into irregular 
payments for medical devices and feared that the inquiry would lead to an investigation by law 
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goes beyond not retaining evidence to formulating a fictional account, 
the conduct speaks for itself. The affirmative creation of false reports 
strongly suggests anticipation of an investigation and intent to impede it. 
For example, in United States v. Moyer,94 a chief of police was 
convicted under § 1519 after falsifying police reports about a racially-
motivated assault resulting in the death of the victim, where the assailant 
was the teenage son of a woman who was both a friend of the chief and 
romantically involved with one of his officers.95 While the Third Circuit 
ruled that proof was not required of a nexus between the conduct and “a 
specific federal investigation,”96 the court emphasized that the statute 
would not reach innocent conduct because “by the express language of 
the statute, no liability will be imposed for knowingly falsifying 
documents without an ‘intent to impede, obstruct, or influence a 
matter.’”97 In response to any suggestion that the statute failed to give 
fair warning, the court remarked that “[a]ny person of ordinary 
intelligence—let alone a chief of police—would comprehend that this 
statute prohibits a police officer from knowingly writing a false report 
with the intent to impede an ongoing, or future, investigation.”98 
Third, in still other cases, the conduct involved so plainly will 
provoke an investigation that the person’s destructive conduct is 
impossible to accept other than in such a light. For example, in United 
States v. McRae,99 a police officer was convicted under § 1519 for 
burning the body of a man who had been shot during the chaos in New 
Orleans in the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.100 Challenging 
§ 1519 as unconstitutionally vague, the defendant argued that, by failing 
to require a relationship between the conduct and a pending or imminent 
investigation, the statute “might criminalize conduct with a highly 
tenuous connection to any investigation at all.”101 While saying the court 
was “receptive to [the defendant’s] well-presented argument on this 
enforcement or regulators when creating a false promissory note for a loan to disguise kick-back 
payments). 
94. 674 F.3d 192 (3d Cir. 2012). 
95. Id. at 199–201. 
96. Id. at 209–10. 
97. Id. at 212 (emphasis in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012)). 
98. Id. at 211; see also United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 742–45 (11th Cir. 2008) (upholding 
conviction where police officer made false statements in a police report, knowing that claims of 
excessive force in an arrest would be investigated by the FBI). 
99. 702 F.3d 806 (5th Cir. 2012). 
100. Id. at 833–34. 
101. Id. at 837. 
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point,”102 the Fifth Circuit observed that this defendant “knowingly 
burned the body of a homicide victim and must have realized that an 
investigation into that homicide would follow.”103 
To be sure, stray comments in a couple of cases could be read to 
divorce § 1519 from any link to a foreseeable investigation. In United 
States v. Gray,104 the Third Circuit said that § 1519 “does not require the 
existence or likelihood of a federal investigation.”105 In United States v. 
Kernell,106 the Sixth Circuit claimed that “[c]ourts considering the 
question have consistently held that the belief that a federal investigation 
directed at the defendant’s conduct might begin at some point in the 
future satisfies the ‘in contemplation’ prong.”107 Still, neither court 
proposed that conduct has been criminalized under § 1519 whenever it 
might impede a speculative future investigation. 
And it goes much too far to ignore the objective “likelihood of a 
federal investigation” when judging whether an individual intended to 
obstruct justice.108 Nor should we countenance the prospect that a person 
interfering with a document or object becomes a felon based merely on 
awareness that an investigation “might begin at some point in the 
future.”109 Applied so broadly, § 1519 would exceed all bounds of fair 
notice and sweep within its criminal designation a host of perfectly 
legitimate acts.110 To criminally convict a person when he or she could 
102. Id. at 838. 
103. Id. 
104. 642 F.3d 371 (3d Cir. 2011). 
105. Id. at 379. 
106. 667 F.3d 746 (6th Cir. 2012). 
107. Id. at 755. 
108. See Gray, 642 F.3d at 379. In Gray, after a corrections officer in a privately owned federal 
prison stripped and beat an inmate for calling a female officer “baby,” witnessing officers prepared 
false reports denying that any force had been used against the inmate. Id. at 373–74. The court 
observed that the government had presented ample evidence that these officers had been trained to 
“write a truthful report when force is used, and cooperate in any investigation,” and that they “were 
aware of the [Department of Justice’s] policy of investigating allegations of excessive force” at the 
prison.” Id. at 379. 
109. See Kernell, 667 F.3d at 755. In Kernell, an individual who had hacked into a vice 
presidential candidate’s private email and then deleted information from his computer had been 
warned online that his activities had been reported to the FBI, knew that the matter had been 
reported to the staff of the candidate, and was contacted by the FBI within two days. Id. at 748–49. 
Thus, for the court to conclude that the defendant “believed a federal investigation was at least the 
possible outcome of his actions,” was an understatement. Id. at 756. 
110. See BRIAN W. WALSH & TIFFANY M. JOSLYN, HERITAGE FOUND. & NAT’L ASS’N OF 
CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, WITHOUT INTENT: HOW CONGRESS IS ERODING THE CRIMINAL INTENT 
REQUIREMENT IN FEDERAL LAW (2010), available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/2010/pdf/ 
WithoutIntent_lo-res.pdf (describing the growing problem of criminal offenses created without an 
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not reasonably have contemplated that an action would obstruct an 
objectively foreseeable investigation or proceeding is the essence of 
strict criminal liability. As Herbert Wechsler wrote sixty years ago, “[t]o 
condemn when fault is absent is barbaric.”111 
D. Safe Harbor for Legal Representation: Encouraging Zealous 
Representation 
The criminal law may influence lawyers’ understanding of the 
bounds of legitimate advocacy not only by clearly proscribing 
certain conduct, but also by its ambiguity.112 
The duty of zealous advocacy was enshrined as one of the nine 
canons of professional ethics in the American Bar Association’s Code of 
Professional Responsibility: “Canon 7: A Lawyer Should Represent a 
Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law.”113 The succeeding 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct do not include an explicit 
statement of this duty in the text of a rule, but the concept is preserved in 
the first comment to Rule 1.3: “A lawyer must also act with commitment 
and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy 
upon the client’s behalf.”114 
Rodney Uphoff rightly observes that “the mere threat of criminal 
prosecution or disciplinary sanctions may well chill some defense 
lawyers from taking action that a zealous advocate ought to be willing to 
take in defending a client.”115 
For that reason, presumably, the chapter in Title 18 of the United 
States Code containing the obstruction of justice statutes contains an 
affirmative defense peculiar to lawyers. Section 1515(c) provides: “This 
chapter does not prohibit or punish the providing of lawful, bona fide, 
legal representation services in connection with or anticipation of an 
official proceeding.”116 This “rather opaque defense to the crime,”117 
adequate mens rea requirement); Stephen F. Smith, Overcoming Overcriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 537, 538 (2012) (quoting United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 284 
(1943) (writing that the growth of regulatory crimes—including many offenses that are “wrongful 
only because [they are] illegal”—threatens to “allow punishment where ‘consciousness of 
wrongdoing be totally wanting’”)). 
111. Herbert Wechsler, A Thoughtful Code of Substantive Law, 45 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & 
POLICE SCI. 524, 528 (1955). 
112. Green, supra note 9, at 362. 
113. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1980). 
114. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2012) (emphasis added). 
115. Rodney J. Uphoff, The Physical Evidence Dilemma: Does ABA Standard 4-4.6 Offer 
Appropriate Guidance?, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1177, 1188 (2011). 
116. 18 U.S.C. § 1515(c) (1996). 
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offers no further elucidation on what constitutes “lawful, bona fide” 
legal representation. As long as the lawyer does not know that the 
client’s objectives are unlawful, he or she should not be chilled from 
zealous representation of a client, including advice regarding the 
destruction of documents or items which the lawyer has no reason to 
believe are relevant to a proceeding or investigation that at least may be 
reasonably anticipated. 
When a lawyer is the target of a prosecution for obstruction of justice, 
the jury should be instructed that bona fide legal representation without 
an improper purpose is a complete defense.118 The jury should be told 
that a lawyer’s “purpose to zealously represent his client is fully 
protected by the law.”119 And, as the Ninth Circuit held in United States 
v. Kellington,120 a lawyer defending himself against a charge of 
obstruction of justice for assisting a client in destroying items is entitled 
to present “expert testimony on the lawyer’s ethical obligations [as] 
relevant to establish the lawyer’s intent and state of mind.”121 
In sum, § 1515(c) provides a safe harbor for lawyers, requiring the 
government to disprove the lawful and bona fide nature of the lawyer’s 
representation beyond a reasonable doubt.122 When a lawyer has advised 
or acted to destroy that which was evidence, but under circumstances 
where an investigation was not reasonably anticipated, then the court 
should presume that lawful purposes were in mind. The court should 
demand that the government present concrete evidence that the lawyer 
should have anticipated an investigation and was acting with an 
improper purpose. 
E. Destroying Contraband That Is Not Evidence to a Reasonably 
Anticipated Investigation or Official Proceeding 
When a thing is illegal to even possess—that is, contraband—the 
lawyer’s conflicting obligations become more poignant and exquisitely 
complicated. 
117. Gillers, supra note 3, at 830; see also O’Sullivan, supra note 51, at 717 (fearing that the 
courts are unlikely to “require proof that the defendant [lawyer] acted with a specific intent or a 
consciousness of wrongdoing”). 
118. See United States v. Mintmire, 507 F.3d 1273, 1277, 1293–94 (11th Cir. 2007) (approvingly 
quoting jury instructions). 
119. Id. 
120. 217 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000). 
121. Id. at 1098; see also United States v. Kloess, 251 F.3d 941, 949 (11th Cir. 2001) (approving 
expert testimony on legal ethics in obstruction case against lawyer). 
122. Mintmire, 507 F.3d at 1294. 
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When a lawyer receives from a client an item that is contraband, and 
“where there is no pending case or investigation relating to this 
evidence,” the American Bar Association advises through its Standards 
for Criminal Justice that “counsel may suggest that the client destroy it,” 
as long as “such destruction is clearly not in violation of any criminal 
statute.”123 Thus, the lawyer should consult appropriate criminal codes to 
determine whether contraband that is not evidence in a pending or 
imminent criminal proceeding or investigation may be destroyed 
lawfully. Proposed revisions to the Standards for Criminal Justice 
circulated in 2014 likewise encourage courts and legislatures to allow 
destruction of contraband, “[w]hen defense counsel reasonably believes 
that contraband does not relate to a pending criminal investigation or 
prosecution.”124 
By contrast, the Reporter’s Notes to the American Law Institute’s 
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, characterize the ABA’s 
position as “problematical,” because “[c]ontraband is both property that 
may be illegal to possess and evidence that may be illegal to destroy.”125 
The American Law Institute’s reporter suggests that a lawyer should 
“read the ABA’s standard with caution.”126 
Consistent with the ABA Standards, Norman Lefstein opined that 
“[f]rom a policy standpoint . . . the attorney who destroys contraband 
should not be prosecuted, because his or her action will have divested 
the client of the contraband and thus deprived the client of its use or the 
possibility of sale or gift to another.”127 For example, while penalizing 
the possession of child pornography, findings enacted as part of a federal 
criminal statute set out Congress’s reasoning that “prohibiting the 
possession and viewing of child pornography will encourage the 
possessors of such material to rid themselves of or destroy the material, 
thereby helping to protect the victims of child pornography and to 
eliminate the market for the sexual exploitative use of children.”128 
Given that the continued existence of the contraband is the greater evil, 
123. STANDARDS FOR CRIM. JUST. § 4-4.6(d) (1993). 
124. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 4-4.7(j)(ii) (Draft of Proposed Revision, 
Approved by Council of Criminal Justice Section, 2014) [hereinafter Proposed Revision to 
Standard] (on file with the author and Washington Law Review). 
125. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 119 reporter’s note (2000). 
126. Id. 
127. Norman Lefstein, Incriminating Physical Evidence, the Defense Attorney’s Dilemma, and 
the Need for Rules, 64 N.C. L. REV. 897, 935 n.188 (1986). 
128. Child Pornography Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121(1)(12), 110 Stat. 3009, 
3009-27 (1996). 
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preventing ongoing possession of the contraband by the client129 and 
removing the items from circulation through destruction is the common-
sense solution.130 
Contraband that is or could be evidence in a pending, imminent, or 
reasonably anticipated criminal investigation or official proceeding may 
not be destroyed, just as other evidence of a crime may not properly be 
destroyed. As a rough guideline, the greater the quantity of the 
contraband material and the less amenable it is to easy destruction, the 
more likely it may be that the contraband material is relevant as evidence 
(or that return to the client is ill-advised for other reasons). Thus, the 
lawyer probably should not return illegal weapons or large quantities of 
illegal narcotics to a client with instructions to destroy them. Such items 
pose heightened public safety concerns and proper disposal of such 
items will be difficult. Moreover, the nature or quantity of these objects 
are more likely to indicate a connection to a criminal enterprise that has 
come to the attention of the authorities and may be the subject of an 
ongoing criminal investigation. 
III. WHEN DOES AN ITEM BECOME REAL EVIDENCE? A CASE 
ILLUSTRATION 
A. The Case of the Child Porn on the Choirmaster’s Computer 
(United States v. Russell) 
1. The Choirmaster at Christ Church and Suspected Child 
Pornography on His Computer 
Christ Church of Greenwich, Connecticut traces its history as a 
congregation back nearly three centuries131 to the Horse Neck chapel 
which was completed in 1749.132 The current church complex was 
129. See United States v. Angle, 234 F.3d 326, 339–40 & n.15 (7th Cir. 2000) (describing as 
interesting the defendant’s argument that his deletion of child pornography computer files meant 
that he did not knowingly continue to possess them, but noting also the government’s response that 
the files were still retrievable because the disk had not been reformatted, although finding it 
unnecessary to decide the question because not all of the files had been deleted). 
130. STANDARDS FOR CRIM. JUST. § 4-4.6 cmt. (1993) (“The social benefit accomplished by the 
destruction and discontinued circulation of such items outweighs any hypothetical social costs 
stemming from the fact that these items have been rendered unavailable to serve as evidence in 
future criminal investigations or prosecutions.”). 
131. History of Christ Church, CHRIST CHURCH GREENWICH (2010), 
http://christchurchgreenwich.org/about/history-christ-church/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2014). 
132. History, HORSENECK FOUNDATION, http://www.horseneckfoundation.org/index.php?ID= 
2633&XID=2633:0:0:0:0&PID=0 (last visited Sept. 15, 2014). 
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constructed on land donated by revolutionary war era founder Isaac 
Knapp.133 The Christ Church campus is across the street from where a 
tavern was owned by Knapp and from which Continental Army General 
Israel Putnam jumped to his horse and barely escaped capture by British 
redcoats in 1779.134 Over the years, more than one of the rectors at 
Christ Church has been consecrated as a bishop in the Episcopal 
Church,135 and notable worshippers in the prominent congregation 
included President George H.W. Bush when he was growing up.136 
By 2006, Robert F. Tate, 65, had served as the choirmaster and 
organist at Christ Church for nearly his entire adult life, going back more 
than three decades.137 By all accounts, Tate was beloved by the 
parishioners.138 One prominent member of the congregation later 
described Tate as “a wonderful, wonderful choir director,” and “the most 
extraordinarily talented and spiritual person.”139 Under Tate’s direction, 
the Christ Church Choir (including many children) had traveled 
throughout Europe140 and produced several albums of music.141 
On October 7, 2006, a church employee borrowed a laptop computer 
belonging to Tate for use in designing a website for an upcoming choir 
event.142 When gathering images from the computer for use on the 
website, the employee discovered numerous pictures of naked boys.143 
Although it does not appear that these images depicted minors engaged 
in actual sexual activity, a prosecutor later reported that this employee 
described the images with the words “lascivious exhibition of the 
133. Id. 
134. Id.; Carl White, All “Downhill” for General Israel Putnam (Literally and Figuratively), 
HISTORICALLY SPEAKING (Aug. 25, 2010, 12:49 PM), http://www.greenwichlibrary.org/blog/ 
historically_speaking/2010/08/all-downhill-for-general-israel-putnam-literally-and-figuratively.html. 
135. History of Christ Church, supra note 131. 
136. Matthew J. Malone, Lawyer Accused of Destroying Evidence in Connecticut Pornography 
Case, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/17/nyregion/17porn.html?_r=1&. 
137. Superseding Indictment at 1, United States v. Russell, No. 3:07-cr-00031-AHN (D. Conn. 
July 18, 2007). 
138. Malone, supra note 136. 
139. Sean Alfano, Ex-Church Official Jailed for Child Porn, CBS NEWS (Jan. 22, 2007, 2:36 
PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/ex-church-official-jailed-for-child-porn/. 
140. Ex-Music Director at Connecticut Church Pleads Guilty to Possessing Child Porn, FOX 
NEWS (Jan. 22, 2007), http://www.foxnews.com/story/2007/01/22/ex-music-director-at-connecticut-
church-pleads-guilty-to-possessing-child-porn. 
141. See, e.g., Christ Church Choir, Sweet Aroma of Praise (August 3, 2014), 
https://itunes.apple.com/us/artist/christ-church-choir/id22716918. 
142. Change of Plea Hearing at 30, United States v. Russell, No. 3:07-cr-00031-AHN (D. Conn. 
June 2, 2008). 
143. Malone, supra note 136. 
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genitals of young boys.”144 Given that these terms are rarely used by 
ordinary people, and that the phrase is a direct quotation from a federal 
child pornography statute,145 it is unlikely this description was uttered 
spontaneously by the witness employee but instead was elicited by law 
enforcement-directed inquiries. 
On October 8, the following day, the rector of Christ Church was 
informed of the employee’s discovery on Tate’s computer. The rector 
sealed up the laptop and immediately sought legal counsel.146 
2. The Church Dismisses the Choirmaster, and the Church Lawyer 
Destroys the Computer Hard-Drive 
Philip D. Russell, age 48, graduated from law school in 1984 and 
became board-certified in “Criminal Trial Advocacy” by the National 
Board of Trial Advocacy in 1994.147 After working as a criminal 
prosecutor in the Bronx, Russell eventually established his own firm in 
Greenwich, Connecticut, focusing on civil and criminal litigation.148 He 
had served as president of the local bar association.149 
Russell’s family worshipped at Christ Church, and the rector knew of 
his reputation as a criminal defense lawyer.150 After the discovery of 
inappropriate images on Tate’s computer, Russell was quickly contacted 
and retained by the church.151 
On October 9, the very next day after the rector learned of the matter, 
Russell and two church leaders confronted Tate.152 Tate acknowledged 
that the computer was his, that he had downloaded the images, and that 
the images were inappropriate.153 Russell told Tate this was a serious 
144. Change of Plea Hearing, supra note 142, at 30. 
145. See 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(B)(iii) (2008) (defining “sexually explicit conduct” for purposes of 
child pornography to include “lascivious exhibition of the genitals”). 
146. Change of Plea Hearing, supra note 142, at 31. Prosecutors charged in the indictment that 
the sealing of the laptop amounted to “treating it as evidence.” Superseding Indictment, supra note 
137, at 2. This may be true in a colloquial sense as the church viewed the laptop as confirmation that 
the choirmaster had acted inappropriately. But church officials cannot be assumed to have taken any 
action with an appreciation of the legal definition of “evidence.” 
147. Attorney Profiles, Philip Russell, Esq., PHILLIP RUSSELL, LLC (2014), 
http://greenwichlegal.com/attorney-profiles/. 
148. See id. 
149. See id. 
150. See Alison Leigh Cowan, Lawyer in Pornography Case is Spared Jail, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
18, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/18/nyregion/18porn.html?pagewanted=print. 
151. See id. 
152. Change of Plea Hearing, supra note 142, at 31. 
153. Id. 
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matter and that possession of child pornography is a federal crime. A 
lawyer is ethically required to clarify his role when a layperson might 
misunderstand.154 Russell properly explained that he represented the 
church and not Tate, advised Tate to get a lawyer, and gave him the 
name of a criminal defense lawyer.155 
Tate was a longstanding employee who was at or near retirement age. 
Without knowledge of any other wrongdoing by Tate, church leaders 
apparently wanted to allow him the dignity of quietly retiring. Moreover, 
the church undoubtedly wanted to avoid embarrassment or harm to the 
strong national and international reputation of the choir. 
After he agreed to resign as choirmaster, Tate packed his possessions 
and vacated the church apartment in which he had been living.156 With 
assistance from church officials and a bevy of supporters in the parish, 
Tate left Connecticut and traveled to California.157 
In sum, the church exercised the lawful (if morally and prudentially 
dubious) choice not to report Tate to the police.158 And yet Russell 
advised church leaders that they could not remain in possession of child 
pornography, which was not a lawful option.159 
Russell returned to his law office with Tate’s laptop. As Russell later 
explained, he did not foresee any law enforcement involvement with the 
matter.160 Knowing that possession of child pornography was unlawful, 
Russell immediately disassembled the computer and pulverized the hard-
drive.161 Less than one hour had elapsed from the time that Russell took 
possession of the computer during the confrontation by church officials 
with Tate to the time that he destroyed it to eliminate any contraband.162 
154. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.3 (1983) (“The lawyer shall not give legal advice 
to an unrepresented person, other than the advice to secure counsel, if the lawyer knows or 
reasonably should know that the interests of such a person are or have a reasonable possibility of 
being in conflict with the interests of the client.”). 
155. Change of Plea Hearing, supra note 142, at 32. 
156. Indictment at 2–3, United States v. Russell, No. 3:07-cr-00031-AHN (D. Conn. July 7, 
2007). 
157. Id. at 2. 
158. See STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 434–36 
(9th ed. 2012). Given that there was no evidence or knowledge about specific children being abused 
by Tate, or even that he had distributed child pornography, a mandatory reporting duty for church 
officials apparently did not apply. 
159. Id. at 435. 
160. Change of Plea Hearing, supra note 142, at 37. 
161. Id. at 33; Cowan, supra note 150; Fails, supra note 9, at 423 n.123. 
162. Defendant Russell’s Application for Downward Departure Consideration and/or a Non-
Guidelines Sentence at 2, United States v. Russell, No. 3:07-cr-00031-AHN (D. Conn. Dec. 12, 
2007). 
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3. The FBI Investigation and Prosecution of the Choirmaster 
The day before the church employee discovered the questionable 
images on Tate’s laptop and two days before the church accepted Tate’s 
resignation and Russell destroyed the laptop hard-drive, the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) started a criminal investigation into Tate’s 
possession of child pornography and exploitation of children.163 There is 
no reason to believe that Russell or church officials knew anything about 
the FBI investigation which had just been initiated independently of the 
discovery at Christ Church.164 
Shortly thereafter, a federal prosecutor contacted Russell to ask about 
the location of Tate’s laptop computer.165 Russell unhesitatingly and 
truthfully responded that he had destroyed it.166 
Tate eventually was arrested in Los Angeles.167 Despite the 
destruction of the laptop, federal investigators found other child 
pornography in Tate’s possession, including sado-masochistic images of 
boys.168 The government found that Tate had possessed child 
pornography for many years and sexually exploited children.169 
Prosecutors said that Tate had brought child prostitutes back to the 
church premises and had traveled overseas to have sex with children.170 
The judge who later accepted the church lawyer’s plea of guilty to 
misprision of a felony171 described Tate’s history of sexual abuse of 
children as “turn[ing] your stomach.”172 
Tate eventually pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography and 
was sentenced to prison in 2008.173 Despite his long history of sexual 
exploitation of minors, Tate was sentenced to only five-and-a-half years 
in prison.174 Indeed, Tate was given credit for cooperating with 
163. Indictment, supra note 156, at 2. 
164. See Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Count One at 4, United States v. Russell, 
No. 3:07-cr-00031-AHN (D. Conn. Apr. 19, 2007). 
165. Change of Plea Hearing, supra note 142, at 38. 
166. Id. 
167. Malone, supra note 136. 
168. Cowan, supra note 150. 
169. Change of Plea Hearing, supra note 142, at 29. 
170. Martin B. Cassidy, Choir Director Sexually Abused Minors, His Lawyer Says, STAMFORD 
ADVOCATE, Dec. 22, 2007, at A1; Cowan, supra note 150. 
171. See infra Part III.A.6. 
172. Cowan, supra note 150. 
173. Change of Plea Hearing, supra note 142, at 29; see also Malone, supra note 136. 
174. Lisa B. Hamilton, Connecticut: Former Music Director Sentenced on Child Pornography 
Charge, EPISCOPAL NEWS SERV. (Feb. 25, 2008), http://archive.episcopalchurch.org/ 
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prosecutors in the case against Russell.175 Tate was released from prison 
only four years after sentencing.176 
4. The Indictment of the Church Lawyer and the Motions to Dismiss 
On February 15, 2007, a federal grand jury returned an indictment 
against Philip Russell, charging him with obstruction of justice under 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1512(c)(1) and 1519.177 Russell appears to have been the first 
lawyer indicted under the new Sarbanes-Oxley obstruction of justice 
statute.178 
For the § 1512(c)(1) count, the indictment contended, inter alia, that 
Russell altered, destroyed, mutilated, and concealed the laptop 
containing child pornography with the intent to impair its availability for 
use in an official proceeding.179 For the § 1519 count, the indictment 
contended that Russell unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly altered, 
destroyed, mutilated, concealed, or covered-up a tangible object, that is, 
the laptop, with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the 
investigation and administration of a matter, namely the FBI 
investigation of Tate’s possession of child pornography and exploitation 
of children.180 
Russell moved to dismiss both counts of the indictment. In moving to 
dismiss the § 1512(c)(1) obstruction of justice count, Russell observed 
that the indictment “fails to allege any nexus between the defendant’s 
conduct and any federal proceeding which was reasonably foreseeable to 
Russell” and argued that “a person cannot . . . obstruct a hypothetical 
future federal proceeding that he does not, and cannot, know about.”181 
“Although the government no longer needs to show a pending 
proceeding,” Russell submitted, “it must still prove that Russell intended 
to obstruct a specific and identifiable official proceeding—which is 
81803_95180_ENG_HTM.htm. 
175. Id. 
176. Martin B. Cassidy, Out of Prison, Tate Moves to New Canaan, NEW CANAAN TIMES (Sept. 
20, 2012), http://www.newcanaannewsonline.com/news/article/Out-of-prison-Tate-moves-to-New-
Canaan-3875556.php. 
177. Indictment, supra note 156, at 3–4. 
178. See John Christoffersen, Sarbanes-Oxley Charges in Conn. Case Worry Corporate Defense 
Lawyers, INSURANCE J. (Mar. 6, 2007), available at http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/east/ 
2007/03/06/77462.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2014); see generally supra Part II.C (discussing 
standards for obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012)). 
179. Indictment, supra note 156, at 3. 
180. Id. at 3–4. 
181. Motion to Dismiss Count One at 1, United States v. Russell, Crim. No. 3:07-cr-00031-AHN 
(D. Conn. Apr. 19, 2007). 
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virtually impossible when no such proceeding has begun or was 
reasonably likely to be instituted in the future.”182 Section 1512(c)(1) 
requires proof of a corrupt purpose and intent to obstruct an official 
proceeding, such as a court or grand jury proceeding.183 
In moving to dismiss the § 1519 count, Russell similarly argued that 
the indictment “fails to allege any nexus between the defendant’s 
conduct and any federal proceeding which was reasonably foreseeable to 
Russell.”184 Russell argued that when he destroyed a computer believed 
to contain contraband “no official proceedings were pending, 
envisioned, or even imagined.”185 He simply did not, he argued, have 
“any reason to suspect that a police investigation was afoot or that the 
matter would in any way generate police interest.”186 
The Connecticut Criminal Defense Lawyers Association filed an 
amicus curiae brief in support of the motion to dismiss the indictment.187 
The amicus contended that without a requirement that the government 
prove a nexus between the obstructive conduct and an official matter, “it 
is impossible under these statutes to decipher the line between conduct 
that is lawfully undertaken in representation of a client, and conduct that 
is undertaken solely for unlawful purposes.”188 
Noting that Russell “was undoubtedly sensitive to his clients’ 
criminal liability” if they kept possession of the computer with child 
pornography, the amicus contended that Russell acted legitimately in the 
case to destroy the computer rather than report the matter to law 
enforcement.189 The indictment, amicus complained, “presents an 
unequivocal position: in order to avoid prosecution, Mr. Russell was 
required to breach the attorney-client privilege and compel his client to 
incriminate itself (specifically Church officials), by turning the 
computer/contraband over to law enforcement.”190 Under difficult 
circumstances, Russell tried to “make the most appropriate legal 
182. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Count One, supra note 164, at 2. 
183. See supra Part II.B (discussing standards for obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1512). 
184. Motion to Dismiss Count Two at 1, United States v. Russell, No. 3:07-cr-00031-AHN (D. 
Conn. Mar. 22, 2007). 
185. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Count Two at 1, United States v. Russell, 
No. 3:07-cr-00031-AHN (D. Conn. Mar. 22, 2007). 
186. Id. at 15. 
187. Brief for Connecticut Criminal Defense Lawyers Ass’n, as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Defendant’s Motions to Dismiss the Indictment, United States v. Russell, No. 3:07-cr-00031-AHN 
(D. Conn. July 2, 2007) [hereinafter Brief of Amicus Curiae]. 
188. Id. at 1. 
189. Id. at 3. 
190. Id. at 8. 
 
                                                     
09 - Sisk_Final_Reviewed_By_Author.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/9/2014  8:29 PM 
2014] LEGAL ETHICS OF REAL EVIDENCE 849 
judgment,” an effort that should not be criminalized.191 
In response, the government “without conceding the point,” assumed 
that there is a nexus requirement under § 1512(c)(1) and that the 
government had to prove that Russell knew his actions were likely to 
affect a proceeding.192 While insisting that § 1519 was “intended to be 
broader than existing obstruction provisions”—by applying to 
investigations, by not requiring that the matter be pending, and by not 
requiring corrupt intent—the government did not directly contest the 
requirement of some nexus between the defendant’s action and an 
anticipated investigation.193 
Pointing out that this was a motion to dismiss an indictment, not a 
sufficiency of the evidence appeal after conviction,194 the government 
argued the indictment sufficiently alleged facts from which the required 
nexus could be proved.195 Because Russell specialized in criminal law 
and recognized the criminal implications of the child pornography, even 
going so far as to give Tate the name of a criminal defense lawyer, the 
government inferred Russell knew that destruction of the laptop would 
obstruct a criminal investigation and proceeding.196 In sum, the 
government contended, “there are ample allegations in the Indictment 
that demonstrate that the defendant destroyed the computer, the tangible 
object, with at least the expectation that a future criminal proceeding was 
going to happen.”197 
5. The Court’s Ruling on the Motions to Dismiss 
In a published decision, the District Court denied both motions to 
dismiss the counts in the indictment.198 
The court summarized Russell’s argument as that “he cannot be 
prosecuted for obstructing a hypothetical future federal proceeding that 
he did not, and could not have known about.”199 In response to Russell’s 
contention that a conviction required a nexus between his obstructive 
191. Id. at 11. 
192. Government’s Omnibus Response to the Defendant’s Motions to Dismiss Counts One and 
Two of the Indictment at 7, United States v. Russell, No. 3:07-cr-00031-AHN (D. Conn. May 25, 
2007). 
193. See id. at 14–15. 
194. Id. at 7. 
195. Id. at 9. 
196. Id. at 9–10, 11–12. 
197. Id. at 21. 
198. United States v. Russell, 639 F. Supp. 2d 226, 230 (D. Conn. 2007). 
199. Id. 
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conduct and a reasonably foreseeable proceeding or investigation, the 
court accepted that statement of the law of obstruction of justice.200 In 
the court’s view, “there appears to be little doubt that the nexus 
requirement applies to prosecutions under both obstruction of justice 
statutes at issue in this case.”201 (Subsequently, the Second Circuit in 
another case disapproved of the Russell court’s nexus ruling, but only to 
the extent it suggested that an official proceeding must actually be 
pending for § 1519 to apply.202) 
But accepting Russell’s statement of the legal requirements for 
conviction did not translate into the court’s acceptance of his arguments 
for dismissal of the indictment. The court explained that “[t]he validity 
of an indictment is tested by its allegations, not by whether the 
government can prove its case.”203 Thus, Russell conflated the claim of 
what must be alleged in the indictment with what must be proven to 
obtain a conviction.204 In the court’s view, the indictment adequately 
stated facts sufficient to allege the required nexus, by adverting to the 
discovery of child pornography on the computer by a church employee, 
Russell’s specialization in criminal law, and that Russell advised Tate to 
contact a criminal defense attorney.205 
In the key holding of the decision, the court stated: 
Essentially, Russell’s motion impermissibly asks the court to 
dismiss the indictment on a factual determination that the 
government cannot prove a nexus between his obstructive act 
and an official proceeding or investigation. But it is the jury, not 
the court, that must determine whether, at the time he destroyed 
Tate’s Computer, an official proceeding as alleged in count one, 
or the FBI investigation as alleged in count two, were 
foreseeable to or anticipated by Russell.206 
6. The Church Lawyer Pleads Guilty to a Lesser Offense 
Facing a twenty-year prison term if convicted of obstruction of 
justice, Russell agreed to plead to the lesser offense of misprision of a 
200. See id. at 234. 
201. Id. 
202. See United States v. Gray, 642 F.3d 371, 378 n.5 (2d Cir. 2011) (“By its plain terms, 
however, § 1519 does not require the existence of an ‘official proceeding.’”). 
203. Russell, 639 F. Supp. 2d at 231. 
204. Id. at 235. 
205. Id. at 236. 
206. Id. at 235. 
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felony,207 a little known catch-all criminal statute that is rarely 
prosecuted.208 Although this federal statute says broadly that a person 
who “conceals and does not as soon as possible make known” the 
commission of a felony that he knows another has committed is guilty of 
misprision,209 the courts interpret the statute to require “some affirmative 
act” of concealment, not merely the “passive failure to report a 
crime.”210 
At the hearing where he entered a guilty plea, Russell took full 
responsibility and said that he was “truly sorry” to the prosecution, the 
court, the people at Christ Church, and the community.211 
Russell was sentenced to home confinement for six months and levied 
a $25,000 fine.212 Although pleading to a lesser offense, misprision is 
still a felony, which carried with it not only the probationary period and 
fine but loss of the right to vote, to hold public office, to serve on a jury, 
and to possess a firearm.213 In addition, Russell was suspended from the 
practice of law for six months.214 He has since been reinstated and 
returned to his successful career as an attorney in Greenwich.215 
B. Lessons Learned? 
1. Does the Identity of the Destroyer Matter? 
The primary lesson that Stephen Gillers draws from this episode is 
that, “even when a lawyer honestly believes that destruction of potential 
evidence is lawful, the lawyer should not be the one to do it.”216 In other 
207. GILLERS, supra note 158, at 435. 
208. Stuart Green, Uncovering the Cover–Up Crimes, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 9, 24 (2005). 
209. 18 U.S.C. § 4 (2012). 
210. Green, supra note 208, at 23. 
211. Change of Plea Hearing, supra note 142, at 28.  
212. Cowan, supra note 150; Molly McDonough, Lawyer Who Destroyed Evidence Spared Jail 
Time, ABA J., (Dec. 17, 2007, 5:27 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/ 
lawyer_who_destroyed_evidence_spared_jail_time/. 
213. Change of Plea Hearing, supra note 142, at 11. 
214. GILLERS, supra note 158, at 435. 
215. Attorney Profiles, Philip Russell, Esq., PHILLIP RUSSELL, LLC (2014), 
http://greenwichlegal.com/attorney-profiles/. 
216. Gillers, supra note 3, at 816. But see Proposed Revision to Standard 4-4.7(j)(ii), supra note 
124 (encouraging adoption of procedures whereby “counsel may take possession of the contraband 
and destroy it” when counsel “reasonably believes that contraband does not relate to a pending 
criminal investigation or prosecution”). As discussed further below, see infra Part III.D, Gillers 
would address the dilemma faced by the lawyer in Russell by creating a new option, by which a 
lawyer could retain evidence while registering continued possession without thereby concealing or 
wrongfully possessing it. Gillers, supra note 3, at 867. 
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words, the lawyer might counsel the client to destroy the material but the 
lawyer should not undertake to do it herself. 
For several reasons, this is good advice: 
First, if the lawyer advises the client that destruction is legitimate but 
leaves action to the client, the lawyer’s counsel may remain confidential. 
Indeed, because destroying an item is not something that falls within the 
typical understanding of legal services, the lawyer is well advised to 
confine her participation to providing legally informed advice to the 
client about whether the item constitutes evidence and whether it may be 
destroyed. 
Second, if the client subsequently should be charged with criminal 
wrongdoing for destroying the item, the lawyer could be called as a 
witness for the defense, outlining the legal advice given and thus 
strengthening the argument that the destruction of the evidence was not 
undertaken by the client with the wrongful intent to obstruct justice. 
Third, the lawyer’s direct participation in destroying an item 
connected to the client’s felonious wrongdoing does open the door to a 
charge of misprision of a felony.217 Even if there is no reason to 
anticipate any criminal investigation or proceeding, thus precluding a 
legitimate accusation of an intent to obstruct justice, destroying proof of 
another’s commission of a felony might be seen as literally falling under 
the misprision statute.218 
And, fourth, law enforcement attention may be less likely to be drawn 
to the lawyer who merely advises but does not act. 
To be sure, the question remains whether the destruction of the item is 
lawful, whether performed by the lawyer or client, and thus whether an 
investigation or proceeding is reasonably foreseeable. Rule 3.4(a) 
admonishes a lawyer not to “unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a 
document or other material having potential evidentiary value,” but 
further states that “[a] lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person 
to do any such act.”219 If it is illegal to destroy an item because it 
constitutes real evidence, it is illegal for the lawyer to be complicit in the 
destruction by instructing the client to do it.220 
217. See supra notes 207–210 and accompanying text. 
218. See 18 U.S.C. § 4 (2012) (prohibiting one who has “knowledge of the actual commission of 
a [federal] felony” from concealing and failing to “make known” the felony to appropriate 
authorities). 
219. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(a) (2013). 
220. See Evan A. Jenness, Ethics and Advocacy Dilemmas—Possessing Evidence of a Client’s 
Crime, CHAMPION, Dec. 2010, at 16, 18 (arguing that suggesting that a client destroy evidence is an 
“even worse” choice). 
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At least one federal court of appeals, in an unpublished decision, goes 
to the furthest extreme by decrying any destruction of what could 
possibly be evidence as obstruction of justice: “It is beyond dispute that 
ordering the erasure of a hard drive containing child pornography, the 
very possession of which violates federal law, falls within the intended 
reach of § 1519.”221 Except, of course, that it is anything but “beyond 
dispute” that destruction of child pornography is illegal when the 
prospect of a criminal investigation is low and thus the destruction 
cannot reasonably be characterized as intended to obstruct justice. 
2. Special Rule for Child Pornography? 
Another practical lesson from Russell may be that a lawyer should 
shun any engagement with those who have downloaded child 
pornography, given the peculiar disgust provoked by the abuse and 
exploitation of innocence.222 (Elsewhere in this Article, the tricky 
problem of contraband evidence is addressed more directly.223) When 
images of sexual abuse of children are involved, the societal response 
has not only been severe but arguably has exceeded bounds of 
proportionality in many cases.224 Federal prosecutions increasingly are 
focused on those charged with passive possession of child pornography 
rather than those who have engaged in sexual abuse of children to 
produce child pornography.225 Moreover, “modern [sentencing] practices 
have resulted in some defendants who possess child pornography 
receiving longer sentences than defendants who sexually abuse 
children.”226 One study found that a person convicted of possession of 
221. United States v. Atkinson, 532 F. App’x 873, 875 (11th Cir. 2013). 
222. Cf. Christina M. Copsey, How Many Is “Any”?: Interpreting § 2252A’s Unit of Prosecution 
for Child Pornography Possession, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1675, 1682 (2013) (commenting that some 
may support any level of enhancement of criminal sentences for offenders given “[t]he repulsive 
nature of child pornography”). 
223. See supra Part II.E; infra Part IV.D. 
224. Carol S. Steiker, Lessons From Two Failures: Sentencing for Cocaine and Child 
Pornography Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in the United States, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 27, 37, 41 (2013) (reporting that “[i]n the span of a single decade (from 1997 to 2007), the 
mean sentence of child pornography offenders increased from 20.59-months to 91.30-months 
confinement—an increase of 443%,” resulting in increased resistance to the severity of sentences in 
the courts). 
225. Melissa Hamilton, The Child Pornography Crusade and Its Net–Widening Effect, 33 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1679, 1692 (2012) (reporting the increase in the number of federal prosecutions 
of passive child pornography cases, which involved no direct child contact, such that in 2010, “the 
number of defendants sentenced for nonproduction child pornography crimes was nearly five times 
the number of defendants sentenced for child sexual abuse offenses”). 
226. Carissa Byrne Hessick, Disentangling Child Pornography from Child Sex Abuse, 88 WASH. 
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child pornography is likely to receive a significantly longer sentence in 
federal court than a person convicted of repeated sexual penetration of a 
twelve-year-old girl.227 
Thus, when criminal investigators discover that a lawyer had either 
destroyed or counseled destruction of child pornography which proves to 
be relevant to an ongoing investigation, they may target the lawyer out 
of a sense of righteous indignation that would not be present had the 
destroyed item been a financial document relevant to a securities crime 
investigation or even narcotics relevant to a drug crime investigation. 
But, again, while a lawyer may be wise to tread very softly when 
child pornography is at issue, that practical guideline is not a genuine 
legal answer to the problem. The client who has an encounter with child 
pornography remains entitled to professional counsel and zealous 
advocacy by the lawyer, whether the problem is of the client’s own 
making (when the client is the immediate offender) or not (when the 
client encounters the obscenity downloaded by another, as did the 
church in this case). Thus, an unduly risk-averse lawyer, overly 
concerned with protecting herself, could become impaired by a personal 
conflict and be unable to offer the advice that best protects the interests 
of the client. 
3. Poor Professional Judgment? 
When a lawyer is representing a client in an exigent circumstance and 
makes a difficult choice in good faith, he should be afforded a wide 
range of professional discretion. To second-guess the lawyer’s judgment 
after the fact, in either scholarly deliberation or by a criminal indictment, 
may well be unfair. With that caveat in mind, circumstances present in 
the Russell case suggest that the lawyer’s decision to destroy the 
evidence may have been poor professional judgment: 
First, the computer involved did not belong to the client church non-
offender but to the choirmaster culprit. The lawyer’s duty was only to 
U. L. REV. 853, 860 (2011). 
227. TROY STABENOW, FED. PUB. DEFENDER OFFICE, DECONSTRUCTING THE MYTH OF CAREFUL 
STUDY: A PRIMER ON THE FLAWED PROGRESSION OF THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY GUIDELINES, 26–
29 (rev. ed. 2009), available at http://www.fd.org/docs/Select-Topics---sentencing/child-porn-july-
revision.pdf; see also United States v. Dorvee, 616 F.3d 174, 187 (2d Cir. 2010) (observing that, 
had defendant “actually engaged in sexual conduct with a minor,” his guidelines range sentence 
could have been considerably lower than for his child pornography conviction without any contact 
with an actual minor); United States v. Henderson, 649 F.3d 955, 965 (9th Cir. 2011) (Berzon, J., 
concurring) (observing that the federal sentencing guideline “often recommends longer sentences 
for those who receive or distribute images of minors than the applicable Guidelines recommend for 
those who actually engage in sexual conduct with minors”). 
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the church and thus reporting the choirmaster for possession of 
contraband would not have placed the lawyer in the position of betraying 
a client to law enforcement. Moreover, by taking possession of that 
computer, the church and its employees had taken possession of 
contraband—innocently to be sure. To avoid any later accusation of 
illegal possession of that contraband by the church employees, and to 
strengthen the defense of innocent and temporary possession, the lawyer 
should have advised the church to disassociate itself from the contraband 
by turning it over immediately to law enforcement. 
Second, and for similar reasons, one may question the wisdom of a 
lawyer assuming possession of a non-client’s property, especially for the 
purpose of destroying it (even assuming that third party’s consent). 
Indeed, once the decision had been made not to report the matter to the 
police (itself a dubious course of action), the best alternative probably 
was to advise Tate to obtain legal counsel while passively allowing him 
to retain and remove his own possessions, including the offending 
laptop. 
Had Tate taken and destroyed his own computer hard-drive—even if 
he later told federal authorities that Russell had been aware of his 
possession of child pornography but not prevented him from removing 
his own possessions from the premises—a federal prosecution of Russell 
is hard to imagine. Indeed, at Russell’s plea hearing, the federal 
prosecutor went so far as to suggest that perhaps Tate would have a right 
to restitution from Russell for the destruction of Tate’s computer,228 
which only confirms that even the prosecutors in this case did not see 
Russell as having a possessory right or affirmative duty with respect to 
handling of the computer. 
Third, the wisdom and morality of the decision of Russell and church 
leaders not to report Tate to the authorities can be questioned as well. 
Given the great damage that has been done to more than one religious 
institution when church officials failed to take immediate steps to 
thoroughly separate themselves from illegal behavior by ministers and 
other church employees relating to children, including reports to law 
enforcement, it is difficult to be sympathetic to the church’s fear of 
embarrassment. At Russell’s sentencing, the judge admonished Russell 
for acceding to the church’s hope that the whole matter would just “go 
away.”229 
228. Change of Plea Hearing, supra note 142, at 16 (“The government’s understanding is that Mr. 
Russell destroyed a computer. Granted, it had child porn on it. It may be that Mr. Tate would ask the 
Court for restitution.”). 
229. Cowan, supra note 150. 
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Moreover, at such an early stage, church leaders may not have all of 
the information to be sure that an employee’s misconduct in one respect 
was not accompanied by other misconduct in similar respects. That of 
course was true with a powerful emphasis in this case. While even now, 
years later, there appears to be no indication that anyone belonging to 
the church was abused directly by Tate, prosecutors did claim that Tate 
hired and retained another employee who abused a child in the choir 
without reporting it to police.230 
Fourth, although neither Russell nor others in the church were aware 
of this at the time, choirmaster Tate’s misconduct was far worse and 
more extensive than a handful of questionable images found on his 
computer. As the later investigation established, mostly from Tate’s own 
confessions, Tate had preyed on children sexually in the past, including 
traveling abroad to have sexual contact with minors and even bringing 
child prostitutes to his apartment at the church.231 Had Russell known 
the full scope of Tate’s sordid behavior, he would have been much more 
likely to foresee a criminal investigation. 
But he did not. The fact remains that Russell and church leaders knew 
only that a longtime choirmaster, beloved by many parishioners, had 
downloaded several images of naked children.232 Even had Russell and 
church leaders conducted a further investigation, there is little reason to 
suppose that they would have learned anything more. There is no 
indication that Tate ever abused a child in the parish or allowed anyone 
else in the parish to learn about his ongoing misconduct. While the judge 
at sentencing excoriated Russell for his bad judgment, focusing on 
Tate’s sickening behavior, the judge did not suggest that Russell was 
aware of these matters or even that he would have uncovered them by 
further investigation. Even at his sentencing, when he confessed to 
wrongdoing, Russell continued to insist that he “did not foresee that 
there was gonna be law enforcement involvement.”233 
And it is very easy to find fault in Russell’s choices when sitting 
comfortably in a faculty office (or, I would be so bold to say, sitting 
behind a bench). The church did not want the matter to become public. 
230. Church Choir Director Hired a Pedophile, Prosecutors Say, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/20/nyregion/20molest.html. 
231. Cassidy, supra note 170; Cowan, supra note 150. 
232. As Russell later argued in a motion in limine to exclude evidence about Tate’s sexual history 
with minors, there is no evidence that Russell or anyone at Christ Church knew about Tate’s other 
behavior. Motion in Limine at 1, United States v. Russell, 639 F. Supp. 2d 226 (D. Conn. 2007) 
(Crim. No. 3:07–CR–31). 
233. Change of Plea Hearing, supra note 142, at 37. 
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Whether one is sympathetic to the fear of reputational harm, the client’s 
objective remains central to any lawyer’s decision. And given that the 
laptop contained contraband, Russell could not simply store it away 
somewhere without risking criminal sanction for unlawful possession of 
child pornography. Russell later described his decision as “impulsive, 
lacking in any forethought or deliberation,” coming within an hour after 
ending up with the computer in his hands.234 Russell had to make a call 
on the fly, without the luxury of time and contemplation.235 
4. An Alternative Hypothetical: The Remorseful Client 
Many of us at some point in our lives engaged in moral misconduct 
that often constituted criminal misconduct, but reached a turning point 
and determined to leave that past behind. Once making that decision, 
abandonment or destruction of the accouterments of a criminal lifestyle 
may be undertaken, not to conceal evidence in anticipation of a criminal 
investigation, but to avoid embarrassment and make a clean break. 
Consider a variation on the Russell scenario which may help to 
separate out the threads of inquiry. Suppose that, instead of being 
approached by the church leaders, a lawyer had been engaged by the 
choirmaster himself who desired to extricate himself from an addiction 
to pedophiliac material. Imagine that this hypothetical choirmaster came 
to our hypothetical lawyer, bringing with him the laptop containing the 
child pornography. The choirmaster admits that he has a problem and 
that he has been downloading child pornography but insists that he has 
not himself abused any child or created any of the obscene material. 
Based on the choirmaster’s narrative, the lawyer has no reason to believe 
that a criminal investigation has targeted him.236 The choir director then 
explains that he has begun psychological counseling and now wishes to 
separate himself entirely from the child pornography by removing his 
cache of such files, just as an alcoholic would rid himself of any alcohol 
in his house. 
Certainly the lawyer in such a hypothetical circumstance must not 
betray the client and report him to law enforcement, which would be 
234. Defendant Russell’s Application for Downward Departure Consideration and/or a Non-
Guidelines Sentence at 2, United States v. Russell, 639 F. Supp. 2d 226 (D. Conn. 2007) (Crim. No. 
3:07–CR–31). 
235. See Uphoff, supra note 115, at 1181 (“[V]ariations on the physical evidence dilemma often 
arise in circumstances that do not allow for careful reflection and meaningful consultation.”). 
236. See Gillers, supra note 3, at 867 (describing this variation on the Russell case and noting 
that, at the time of the hypothetical meeting, “the choirmaster might never have become the focus of 
an investigation”). 
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antithetical to the fiduciary attorney-client relationship and an egregious 
breach of professional confidentiality.237 Moreover, given the “basic 
human right not to assist the government in causing one’s own 
destruction,”238 the client is not obliged to self-report nor is the lawyer 
ethically obliged to encourage him to do so (ordinarily, quite the 
opposite). At the same time, the lawyer cannot tell the client to simply 
hold on to the child pornography-tainted computer, not only because it 
would be detrimental to the client’s mental recovery but also because the 
continued possession of such contraband is illegal. And the lawyer 
cannot take the laptop and turn it over to law enforcement, given the 
ease with which computer forensics would identify the owner. As 
Stephen Gillers writes, surrender of the laptop to law enforcement 
“would certainly seal the choirmaster’s fate,” which is an “unacceptable” 
solution.239 
The courts should long hesitate to read an obstruction of justice 
statute to effectively forbid a person from ever turning away from past 
misdeeds and shutting the door by discarding the residue of that past life. 
To be sure, once an investigation is underway or is reasonably 
anticipated, it may be too late and steps taken at that point to hide, 
destroy, or alter that which may constitute evidence of criminal 
wrongdoing are difficult or impossible to separate from an intent to 
impede the investigation. 
But when an investigation is only a possibility from the perspective of 
the actor, with no awareness of law enforcement interest or objective 
reason to believe a specific investigation into this matter will be 
forthcoming, then a person should be encouraged to make a break from a 
criminal past. An individual’s admirable resolve to separate from 
wrongdoing by tossing aside the instruments and forbidden objects of 
that wrongdoing should not readily be characterized as the equivalent of 
a specific intent to obstruct justice. 
Let me take it a step further and make the hypothetical even more 
difficult. Suppose that our hypothetical client-choirmaster had 
acknowledged that he is finding it difficult to take the last step and 
destroy the cache of child pornography. Might the lawyer offer to do it 
himself, just as a loved one of an alcoholic or a heroin addict might 
intervene by finding all of the intoxicating beverages or narcotics in the 
237. See Counsel for Discipline v. Tonderum, 840 N.W.2d 487, 491–92 (Neb. 2013) (suspending 
a lawyer indefinitely for disclosing to the prosecution confidential information about criminal 
charges against a former client). 
238. See Green, supra note 208, at 32. 
239. GILLERS, supra note 158, at 435. 
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house and pouring them down the drain or flushing them down the 
toilet? If a lawyer does the hypothetical choirmaster-client this favor of 
facilitating his psychological rehabilitation by removing the child 
pornography from him and then destroying it (remembering that keeping 
it would amount to his own possession of contraband), would that 
lawyer really be targeted for criminal prosecution? If so, then the lawyer 
really is left with the “irreconcilable options” of abandoning a client in 
his moment of need, leaving the client to continue in the unlawful 
possession of contraband, or betraying the client to law enforcement.240 
5. Encouraging Zealous Advocacy and Discouraging Prosecutorial 
Overreach 
The prosecution of the lawyer in Russell plainly was designed to send 
a chilling message from the government to lawyers.241 And the message 
was that a lawyer in possession of evidence of someone’s wrongdoing 
must report that person to prosecutors—or turn over the incriminating 
material, which is the same thing—even if the lawyer has no concrete 
and objective reason to believe the person is coming under criminal 
investigation.242 When we recognize that this message remains the same 
even if the wrongdoer is the lawyer’s client, the danger to effective 
representation of possible targets of criminal investigation becomes 
plain. As the Connecticut Criminal Defense Association argued as 
amicus in the Russell case: 
If attorneys are forced to incriminate their clients in an effort to 
avoid being charged with obstruction of justice themselves, 
zealous advocacy becomes impossible, the attorney-client 
relationship becomes imperiled, and the careful balance of our 
adversarial system is disrupted.243 
The appropriate solution, then, is to balance (A) the lawyer’s need to 
uphold her duties to a client without fear that any misstep will lead to a 
criminal conviction and loss of a professional license against (B) the 
public interest in preventing someone from knowingly or recklessly 
240. See Fails, supra note 9, at 423 n.123. 
241. See id. at 429 (“Commentators largely condemned [Russell’s] prosecution as retribution and 
prosecutorial overreach.”). 
242. See Evan T. Barr, ‘Russell’: Prosecuting Defense Counsel for Obstruction, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 
21, 2007, at 2 (advising that, in light of the Russell court’s failure to dismiss, lawyers who come into 
possession of “questionable material” should “assume the worst, and contact the authorities right 
away, rather than face the dilemma of being blamed either for retaining or destroying the 
contraband in question”). 
243. Brief of the Amicus Curiae, supra note 187, at 3. 
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destroying evidence that would be relevant in prosecuting an offender. 
And that line is best drawn by a presumption, consistent with the 
heightened burden of proof in a criminal charge of obstruction of justice, 
that a lawyer acts legitimately in handling and destroying documents or 
items unless there is a clear signal of a foreseeable criminal investigation 
that a reasonable lawyer would recognize. The courts should permit a 
prosecution for obstruction of justice against a lawyer representing a 
client to proceed only if convinced that a jury could find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the lawyer had anticipated an investigation and 
acted to impede it.244 
In United States v. Stevens,245 a federal district court took the unusual 
but commendable step of interrupting the prosecution of a lawyer for 
obstruction of justice and ordering acquittal for charges based on the 
lawyer’s legal advice to a client.246 While the court acknowledged that 
some of the responses made by the pharmaceutical company to the Food 
and Drug Administration were imperfect, the in-house counsel had 
directed the drafting of those statements as legal advice and in good faith 
reliance on the advice of other internal and outside lawyers.247 In an 
earlier ruling, the court held that “the most reasonable reading” of 
§ 1519 “imposes criminal liability only on those who were conscious of 
the wrongfulness of their actions,” because otherwise § 1519 would 
“reach inherently innocent conduct, such as a lawyer’s instruction to his 
client to withhold documents the lawyer in good faith believes are 
privileged.”248 
The judge in Stevens “carved out a specific role for the judiciary”249 
in preventing prosecutorial overreach in targeting lawyers for 
obstruction of justice charges: 
The institutional problem that causes me a great concern is that 
while lawyers should not get a free pass, the Court should be 
vigilant to permit the practice of law to be carried on, to be 
engaged in, and to allow lawyers to do their job of zealously 
representing the interests of their client. Anything that interferes 
with that is something that the court system should not 
244. Barr, supra note 242 (saying that, on whether there was a foreseeable matter to obstruct, the 
Russell court “should have explored how these allegations, even if established at trial, ever could 
have led to a sustainable finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt”). 
245. Bench Ruling, Crim. No. RWT–10–694 (D. Md. May 10, 2011). 
246. Id. 
247. Id. at 5; see generally Fails, supra note 9, at 413–30 (discussing the Stevens case). 
248. United States v. Stevens, 771 F. Supp. 2d 556, 561 (D. Md. 2011). 
249. Fails, supra note 9, at 419. 
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countenance.250 
IV. HOW MAY THE LAWYER ENGAGE WITH REAL 
EVIDENCE? THE LAW ON OBSERVATION AND 
EXAMINATION 
For the next two parts of this Article, I assume that the documents or 
items involved in the cases and hypothetical discussed are indeed real 
evidence that is potentially relevant to a reasonably anticipated 
investigation or proceeding.251 Accepting that the real evidence may not 
be destroyed, which would constitute obstruction of justice,252 the next 
questions concern the lawyer’s responsibilities when observing evidence 
without removing it or taking possession,253 after taking possession of 
evidence for examination,254 and when receiving evidence from the 
client or a third person,255 as well as the tricky problem of examining 
contraband evidence.256 
A. Defense Lawyer Observing Evidence Without Taking Possession 
When a lawyer takes actual possession of real evidence, even 
temporarily, special responsibilities attach.257 By contrast, when the 
lawyer learns about the location of real evidence from the client, even if 
followed up by passive observation, the attorney-client privilege protects 
against disclosure.258 The lawyer for a client may observe evidence in its 
original condition, such as by verifying that an item truly exists at a 
particular location or by taking photographs at the scene of a crime, at 
least if the lawyer takes appropriate steps to avoid altering characteristics 
of the scene. In sum, when based on a client’s description of events or 
circumstances, the lawyer’s knowledge and attendant observations short 
of taking possession of real evidence are protected by the attorney-client 
privilege. 
In the classic “Buried Bodies Case” from Lake Pleasant, New York, a 
250. Stevens, Bench Ruling, Crim. No. RWT–10–694, at 10. 
251. See supra Parts II & III. 
252. See supra Parts II.A–C. 
253. See infra Part IV.A. 
254. See infra Parts IV.B & E. 
255. See infra Part IV.C. 
256. See infra Part IV.D. 
257. See infra Parts IV.B–E. 
258. Wemark v. State, 602 N.W.2d 810, 816 (Iowa 1999); Clutchette v. Rushen, 770 F.2d 1469, 
1473 (9th Cir. 1985). 
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person charged with murder confidentially confessed to his lawyers that 
he had also committed other murders and left the bodies of the victims in 
a wooded area, which he described to the lawyers.259 One of the lawyers 
visited the scene and found skeletal remains, which he photographed.260 
The lawyers kept the crimes, as well as the location of the bodies, secret 
for many months, only revealing this information when calling the client 
to testify to the additional murders in support of an insanity defense at 
the client’s murder trial. When one of the lawyers was indicted for a 
violation of a state statute requiring anyone knowing of the death of a 
person to report it to authorities to afford a decent burial, the trial court 
dismissed the charges on the ground that the lawyer’s silence was 
required by the attorney-client privilege.261 
While the New York appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the 
indictment, it expressed unease about whether the attorney-client 
privilege covered the situation, saying that the lawyer’s protection of the 
client’s interest ought to be balanced against “basic human standards of 
decency” and “due regard to the need that the legal system accord justice 
to the interests of society and its individual members.”262 However, the 
New York State Bar Association ethics committee opined that the 
lawyers were obliged under the ethics rules not to reveal the information 
because it was the result of the client’s confidential communication.263 
In the ensuing thirty years, the consensus among scholars and other 
observers has been that the state bar ethics committee reached the 
correct result, which is that the observation of evidence in its original 
location by a lawyer pursuant to a client’s confidential communication 
falls comfortably within the privilege. 
B. Defense Lawyer Taking Possession of Evidence for Examination 
1. Defense Lawyer’s Right to Examine Evidence 
A lawyer representing an actual or potential criminal defendant “has 
the same privilege as a prosecutor to possess and examine [physical 
evidence] for the lawful purpose of assisting in the trial of criminal 
259. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 12.6.1, at 664 (1986). 
260. The lawyer also moved some of the remains, id., although no suggestion apparently was 
made in this case, arising in the early 1970s, that forensic characteristics of the scene had been 
altered in a material way. 
261. People v. Belge, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Cnty. Ct. 1975), aff’d, 376 N.Y.S.2d 771 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1975), aff’d, 359 N.E.2d 377 (N.Y. 1976). 
262. Belge, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 772. 
263. N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 479 (1978). 
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cases.”264 As the Iowa Supreme Court stated in Wemark v. State,265 “[i]f 
the defense lawyer does not take possession of the instrument of the 
crime, there can be no opportunity to have it examined for any evidence 
that may be critical to the defense.”266 
Section 119 of the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers states 
that a lawyer properly may take possession of physical evidence of a 
client crime “to examine it and subject it to tests that do not alter or 
destroy material characteristics of the evidence.”267 Accordingly, a 
lawyer who is not reasonably familiar with and prepared to adhere to 
standards for collection and examination of evidence—including modern 
forensic techniques, preserving and avoiding contamination of evidence, 
establishing the chain of custody, etc.268—should not remove evidence 
from its original location or conduct tests of the items. 
Moreover, because taking possession of real evidence could lead to 
disclosure to the prosecution, even if law enforcement would not 
otherwise have discovered it,269 defense counsel should acquire real 
evidence only if “they believe the client’s defense genuinely requires 
it.”270 Indeed, commentators advise that “a lawyer can avoid some 
subsequent legal and ethical dilemmas by refusing to take possession of 
evidence of a client’s crime.”271 
Today, however, a lawyer’s right to independent examination of real 
evidence takes on heightened importance as the infirmities of state and 
county crime laboratories become increasingly manifest.272 A series of 
public scandals involving law enforcement-affiliated crime labs, from 
the St. Paul, Minnesota police department crime lab to the North 
Carolina State Bureau of Investigation crime lab, have revealed a 
troubling absence of standard procedures, faulty testing techniques, the 
failure to acknowledge when initial test results could not be confirmed, a 
general “pro-prosecution bias,” and poorly trained staff with a “woeful 
264. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 119 cmt. b (2000). 
265. 602 N.W.2d 810 (Iowa 1999). 
266. Id. at 817. 
267. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 119(1) (2000). 
268. See generally OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, CRIME SCENE: A GUIDE FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT (2000), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/178280.pdf (providing 
guidelines for law enforcement officers). 
269. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
270. Norman Lefstein, Incriminating Physical Evidence, the Defense Attorney’s Dilemma, and 
the Need for Rules, 64 N.C. L. REV. 897, 931 (1986) (emphasis in original). 
271. Joy & McMunigal, supra note 37, at 55. 
272. See Rodney Uphoff, Convicting the Innocent: Aberration or Systemic Problem?, 2006 WIS. 
L. REV. 739, 782–83. 
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ignorance of basic scientific principles.”273 A 2009 study of public 
forensics labs by the National Academy of Sciences reported: 
[T]he quality of forensic practice in most disciplines varies 
greatly because of the absence of adequate training and 
continuing education, rigorous mandatory certification and 
accreditation programs, adherence to robust performance 
standards, and effective oversight. These shortcomings 
obviously pose a continuing and serious threat to the quality and 
credibility of forensic science practice.274 
Even before it arrives at the crime lab, police may fail to properly 
collect, handle, and preserve real evidence.275 
For many reasons, then, defense counsel should hesitate to accept any 
forensic findings by law enforcement. Effective assistance of counsel for 
a criminal defendant, as expected under the Sixth Amendment, may 
mandate independent scientific testing of real evidence.276 
Indeed, if it truly is the case that a criminal defense lawyer has the 
same privilege to examine the evidence as does a prosecutor, then the 
defense lawyer should also have the right to conduct or arrange for 
laboratory tests of the evidence, even if such testing may affect the 
characteristics of the evidence. When appropriate forensic examination 
of real evidence will unavoidably degrade the evidence or change its 
characteristics, the criminal defense lawyer nonetheless should be 
permitted to conduct those tests. No principle of law requires that a 
criminal defense lawyer defer to or grant priority to law enforcement-
affiliated crime labs. Prosecutors should not later be heard to insist that a 
defense lawyer should have immediately surrendered the evidence, 
refrained from any testing, and abjectly deferred to state or county crime 
laboratories that may or may not be competent to perform the task. 
In sum, contrary to the conventional wisdom held by many lawyers, 
273. Mark Hansen, A String of Shoddy, Suspect and Fraudulent Results Has Put Forensics Labs 
under the Microscope, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2013, at 45, 46–50. 
274. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A 
PATH FORWARD 6 (2009), available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12589& 
page=6. 
275. Uphoff, supra note 272, at 782 (referring to the “Myth” that “the Police Properly Collect, 
Handle, Preserve, and Analyze Forensic Evidence”). 
276. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-4.1(d) (Proposed 
Revisions 2010) (stating that defense counsel’s “investigation should include independent 
evaluation of the prosecution’s evidence (including possible retesting or reevaluation of physical, 
forensic, and expert evidence)”), appended to Rory K. Little, The Role of Reporter for a Law 
Project, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 747, 785 (2011) [hereinafter PROPOSED REVISIONS TO ABA 
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE]. 
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law enforcement does not hold a legal monopoly on the finding and 
examination of real evidence. While a defense lawyer may not invade a 
crime scene that is under the control of law enforcement, that lawyer is 
not prohibited from visiting the crime scene beforehand or afterward. 
To be sure, the criminal defense lawyer may take a risk of being 
accused of improper behavior or of obstruction of justice if she visits a 
crime scene, examines and tests evidence, and the evidence is thereby 
necessarily or inadvertently altered. When law enforcement personnel 
improperly handle or incompetently test evidence, they rarely need fear 
an obstruction of justice charge. But a criminal defense attorney or 
investigator may well come under greater scrutiny and be extended little 
benefit of the doubt. 
Not surprisingly, criminal defense lawyers are leery about 
engagement with real evidence, at least prior to examination by law 
enforcement. For practical reasons, including the sad possibility of 
overzealous reaction by prosecutors, this is understandable. But 
reticence is not legally compelled and, indeed, zealous advocacy for a 
criminal defendant may require such engagement, as uncomfortable as it 
may make the criminal defense lawyer. 
After this Article had originally been written, the Council of the 
American Bar Association’s Criminal Justice Section approved a revised 
draft of Standard 4-4.7 of the Standards for Criminal Justice that more 
affirmatively recognizes the criminal defense lawyer’s right to conduct 
independent forensic examination and testing of physical evidence.277 
Indeed, in contrast with the Restatement of the Law Governing 
Lawyers,278 this revised Standard—if ultimately approved by the ABA 
House of Delegates—would authorize testing that alters forensic 
characteristics, as long as the testing does not consume or destroy the 
item. 
Under paragraph (g) of the proposed revision, a lawyer who 
“determines that effective representation of the client requires that the 
evidence be submitted for forensic examination and testing” would be 
permitted to go forward.279 The lawyer would be expected to follow 
procedures for handling the evidence that “insure its integrity” and to 
“avoid, whenever possible, consumption of the item” so that the 
evidence could later be tested or examined by the prosecution.280 If a test 
277. Proposed Revision to Standard 4-4.7(g), supra note 124. 
278. See supra note 267 and accompanying text. 
279. Proposed Revision to Standard 4-4.7(g), supra note 124. 
280. Id., Standard 4-4.7(g)(i) to (ii). 
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of the evidence would “entirely consume or destroy the prosecution’s 
opportunity to re-test the item,” then a criminal defense lawyer would be 
obliged to notify the prosecution to allow an opportunity to object and 
ask for judicial relief.281 
If the forensic testing by the criminal defense team does change or 
alter material characteristics of real evidence, then the defense lawyer 
might be required to share the laboratory results or at least confirm that 
testing was done, at the appropriate time.282 However, in discussing 
disposition of evidence immediately below, I submit that notification of 
forensic testing need be made only when law enforcement appropriately 
and independently obtains the evidence. If law enforcement would not 
find the evidence for reasons other than the lawyer’s interference (such 
as a failure to search the original location), then law enforcement should 
not receive the windfall of defense counsel’s diligent work in conducting 
a test of the evidence—unless, of course, the defense intends to use the 
evidence as exculpation, in which case early disclosure is probably wise. 
Under the proposed revision of the ABA Standard, a criminal defense 
lawyer who planned to conduct testing that would consume or destroy 
the evidence altogether would be required to give advance notice to the 
prosecution.283 Given that consumptive testing would deprive the 
prosecution of any opportunity to conduct its own tests, such a notice 
requirement tends to uphold fair and equal treatment in the adversarial 
process. Under similar circumstances, law enforcement presumably has 
a similar duty of advance notice to defense counsel when forensic testing 
would consume or destroy physical evidence. Circumstances are not 
always parallel, of course; law enforcement may need to conduct testing 
before a suspect has been identified or when exigencies of public safety 
are present. 
When a criminal defense lawyer’s examination or testing of evidence 
has not consumed the item, but some characteristics necessarily have 
been altered at least to the extent of indicating the evidence was handled, 
the defense lawyer is under no such duty to provide advance notification. 
Indeed, the criminal defense lawyer should not be obliged to confirm the 
existence of the real evidence or that non-consumptive testing was 
performed unless and until law enforcement has independently 
discovered the evidence in its original location or from the original 
281. Id., Standard 4-4.7(g)(iv) to (v). 
282. Cf. Uphoff, supra note 115, at 1211 (“If testing will use up the entire sample, however, and 
then [the lawyer] decides to test anyway, she is obligated to reveal the results to the authorities even 
if doing so might prove incriminating.”). 
283. Proposed Revision to Standard 4-4.7(g), supra note 124. 
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possessor. 
2. Disposition of Evidence by Defense Lawyer After Examination 
After a lawyer has taken possession of real evidence of a potential 
crime for examination or testing, the crucial remaining question regards 
proper disposition of that evidence. And on this point, the authorities are 
in conflict. 
Comment 2 to Rule 3.4 is equivocal, saying that the “law may require 
the lawyer to turn the evidence over to the police or other prosecuting 
authority, depending on the circumstances.”284 A few state court 
decisions suggest the lawyer must turn over real evidence to the 
government after testing,285 but these courts arrive at that conclusion 
with little analysis and without careful evaluation of defense counsels’ 
professional responsibilities and defendants’ constitutional rights.286 
By contrast, Standard 4-4.6 of the American Bar Association’s 
Standards for Criminal Justice suggests that the lawyer should disclose 
the location or deliver the item to law enforcement only if law or a court 
order requires or, depending on the circumstances, if the item is 
contraband.287 Instead, as a general rule, Standard 4-4.6 directs that the 
lawyer should return such evidence to the source, which may be either a 
person or a location.288 The commentary to the standard warns that a 
mandate to turn over all real evidence to the government would 
discourage defense counsel investigations and undermine the 
confidentiality of attorney-client communications.289 
In the course of preparing the Restatement of the Law Governing 
Lawyers, the drafters at the American Law Institute began with one 
position (which coincided with that of the Standards for Criminal 
Justice) but ended with another. A tentative draft of the Restatement 
would have allowed the lawyer “to return the evidence to the site from 
which it was taken, when that can be accomplished without destroying 
284. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4 cmt. 2 (2013) (emphasis added). 
285. See Joy & McMunigal, supra note 37, at 45. 
286. Lefstein, supra note 270, at 918. For further discussion of the erroneous conventional 
wisdom that real evidence must be delivered to law enforcement after examination, see infra Part 
IV.E. 
287. STANDARDS FOR CRIM. JUST. § 4-4.6(a)(1), (a)(2), (d) (1993). 
288. Id. § 4-4.6(b). The commentary to the standard explains that “[t]his rule of return to the 
source applies whether the source is the client, a third party, or a physical location.” Id. § 4-4.6 cmt.; 
see also Hitch v. Superior Court, 708 P.2d 72, 78 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc) (allowing attorney to return 
evidence to source). 
289. STANDARDS FOR CRIM. JUST. § 4-4.6 cmt. 
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or altering material characteristics of the evidence.”290 However, in the 
final version of the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, the 
provision allowing return of the item to the site from which it was taken 
was deleted. Section 119 instead states that, after possession, “the lawyer 
must notify prosecuting authorities of the lawyer’s possession of the 
evidence or turn the evidence over to them.”291 
Notwithstanding this change in language to this Restatement section, 
the accompanying comment notes that some decisions “allude[] to an 
additional option—returning the evidence to the site from which it was 
taken, when that can be accomplished without destroying or altering 
material characteristics of the evidence,” although the comment suggests 
that approach “will often be impossible.”292 Ronald Rotunda and John 
Dzienkowski similarly argue that “[i]n light of advances in forensic 
science, it is hard to imagine how a lawyer could return physical 
evidence to the scene of the crime without leaving the lawyer’s DNA on 
the evidence or without feeling the need to remove fingerprints and other 
indicia of the lawyer’s possession of the evidence,” which conduct 
“would constitute tampering or altering the evidence.”293 
In my view, the option of returning the evidence to its source after 
examination ought to be presumptively and generally available. Law 
enforcement would not be disadvantaged and would have every fair and 
reasonable opportunity to discover the evidence at its original location. 
When the evidence is promptly returned to its original place, even after 
the lawyer has examined it, the situation is restored to what it would 
have been had the lawyer merely been informed of the location (which 
of course imposes no duty of disclosure).294 While a lawyer may have 
“no right to make the police officer’s job more difficult with respect to 
the discovery of physical evidence,”295 the lawyer also has no duty to 
make the police officer’s job any easier. As Stephen Gillers writes, 
“[t]he [ethical] rules don’t transform the lawyer for a private client into 
290. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 179 (Tentative Draft No. 8, 1997). 
291. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 119(2) (2000); see also 1 
HAZARD & HODES, supra note 33, § 9.32, at 9-130 (arguing that, while mandatory disclosure 
“run[s] counter to the tradition of client loyalty, any other rule would inevitably degenerate into a 
race between the police and a suspect’s lawyer to be first to take possession of evidence”). 
292. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 119 cmt. c (2000). 
293. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: A 
STUDENT’S GUIDE § 3.4-2(a), at 821 n.10 (2013/2014). 
294. Lefstein, supra note 270, at 929; see also supra Part IV.A. 
295. 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 30.5, at 
30-14 (3d ed., 2001 & Supp. 2011). 
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an arm of the state.”296 
Moreover, the defendant’s constitutional right against self-
incrimination is not adequately preserved if a lawyer who examines 
evidence must thereafter deliver it up to law enforcement.297 Even if the 
real evidence is not a document that amounts to a testimonial statement, 
and thus is not itself protected by the Fifth Amendment right against 
self-incrimination, the Supreme Court in Fisher v. United States298 
observed that the act of producing evidence has “communicative aspects 
of its own, wholly aside from” the nature of the paper or item.299 Thus, 
as the Court held in United States v. Hubbell,300 the Fifth Amendment is 
implicated when the act of production “could provide a prosecutor with 
a ‘lead to incriminating evidence,’ or ‘a link in the chain of evidence 
needed to prosecute.’”301 Indeed, two members of the Hubbell Court 
found historical evidence “that the Fifth Amendment privilege protects 
against the compelled production not just of incriminating testimony, but 
of any incriminating evidence.”302 
To compel an attorney who has examined evidence, which the 
attorney uncovered through the client’s confidential communication, to 
then pass it on to law enforcement is constitutionally dubious. In that 
scenario, the accused has been degraded into “the deluded instrument of 
his own conviction.”303 As Monroe Freedman and Abbe Smith 
emphasize, a criminal “defendant’s constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination [is] safeguarded by his constitutional right to counsel.”304 
At the very least, as Kevin Reitz rightly insists, “[t]here should be no 
constitutional tariff upon the act of obtaining counsel.”305 
To be sure, in many or most cases that involve real evidence other 
than documents, it may be impossible to return physical evidence to the 
296. STEPHEN GILLERS, ESSENTIALS: REGULATION OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 243 (2009). 
297. Gillers, supra note 3, at 824–29. 
298. 425 U.S. 391 (1976). 
299. Id. at 410. On the privilege against self-incrimination as preventing a suspect from being 
compelled to produce real evidence where production would authenticate evidence, admit that it 
exists, or show the suspect had control over it, see generally Kevin R. Reitz, Clients, Lawyers and 
the Fifth Amendment: The Need for a Projected Privilege, 41 DUKE L.J. 572, 642–45 (1991). 
300. 530 U.S. 27 (2000). 
301. See id. at 41–42. 
302. Id. at 49 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
303. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 581 (1961) (quoting 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, PLEAS 
OF THE CROWN 595 (8th ed. 1824)). 
304. MONROE FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS § 6.16, at 175 
(4th ed. 2010). 
305. Reitz, supra note 299, at 650. 
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original location without some alteration of material characteristics at 
the site, if not in the evidence itself. Thus, under Restatement § 119, the 
lawyer who has taken possession of physical evidence of a client crime 
for examination would be obliged to notify the prosecuting authorities 
that the lawyer has the evidence or to directly turn the evidence over to 
those authorities. But the conclusion reached by the Restatement does 
not logically follow. As Gillers aptly writes, the “breadth” of the 
Restatement § 119 mandate to deliver evidence to law enforcement is 
“astonishing.”306 
To begin with, if the forensic properties of the site or the evidence 
itself have been altered by the criminal defense lawyer exercising the 
right to examine the evidence, then that change in characteristics will 
have occurred whether the lawyer returns the evidence to its original 
location or instead delivers it to law enforcement. The question is not 
whether there are changes caused by the lawyer’s appropriate 
examination but what should be done to apprise law enforcement of such 
changes. Thus, the real issue is whether, when, and how law 
enforcement should be notified of those changes in the evidence so that 
law enforcement is not disadvantaged by the lawyer’s otherwise proper 
examination. 
Ordering that the lawyer deliver real evidence to law enforcement 
after examination ensures both that law enforcement will gain access to 
the evidence, which may or may not otherwise have occurred, and that 
law enforcement will know that the lawyer had been an intervening 
player, which thus explains any changes in forensic characteristics. The 
government may be entitled to the latter, but not the former. If there is a 
way to fairly ensure that lawyer-caused changes in forensic 
characteristics come to the attention of law enforcement if and when it 
finds evidence, then there is no reason to give law enforcement the 
windfall of delivery of evidence that it would not have found on its own. 
Again, given that the lawyer’s knowledge about the real evidence and its 
location frequently comes from a confidential communication to the 
lawyer, simply delivering the evidence to law enforcement in every case 
punishes the client for the confidential communication and discourages 
defense counsel from exercising the important right to examine 
evidence. In sum, imposing a general and unqualified duty of delivery of 
examined evidence to the government contravenes basic principles of 
professional responsibility as well as a criminal defendant’s 
constitutional right against self-incrimination and constitutional 
306. Gillers, supra note 3, at 848. 
 
                                                     
09 - Sisk_Final_Reviewed_By_Author.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/9/2014  8:29 PM 
2014] LEGAL ETHICS OF REAL EVIDENCE 871 
entitlement to effective assistance of counsel. 
As discussed below, Gillers proposes a new registry system which 
would allow lawyers to retain evidence while giving law enforcement 
access to that evidence if an investigation later is directed against the 
client and law enforcement is unaware of the lawyer’s retention.307 In 
any event, the lawyer who examines evidence should be permitted to 
return it to the original location, notwithstanding forensic consequences 
(at least as long as the lawyer acted with reasonable care in compliance 
with expectations of forensic science). 
In most instances, the lawyer could simply attach a note or label to the 
real evidence, perhaps encased in clear plastic like the common desk-top 
paper weight. The plastic casing would serve to hold down the note, so it 
does not blow away, and to protect it from the elements. The note would 
inform law enforcement that, if the evidence should be discovered, that 
the lawyer conducted forensic testing and that the examination 
necessarily made changes in the site or evidence. And if the original 
location of the evidence is the client’s home or place of business, the 
lawyer will be informed if a search is conducted, at which point the 
lawyer might be obliged to explain any alteration. In neither case has the 
lawyer caused an obstruction of the investigation, much less had the 
requisite specific intent to do so.308 Instead, the lawyer would be 
prepared to offer appropriate assistance to the investigation through the 
sharing of information if and when that investigation successfully 
uncovers the evidence. 
In any event, the option to replace evidence plainly is appropriate 
when the item does not contain any material forensic characteristics that 
could be altered. In particular, real evidence within the scope of this 
Article includes not only objects, but also documents and computer data. 
Documents and electronic data ordinarily may be returned to the original 
location, such as a client’s office files or computer archives, without 
affecting any evidentiary characteristics (and assuming the client has 
been appropriately counseled about the law against improper 
concealment or destruction of evidence). 
Whatever might be the correct disposition of evidence under other 
circumstances, when even temporary possession of the evidence by the 
lawyer has operated to deny lawful discovery of the evidence by law 
enforcement, the lawyer then probably should be obliged to disclose the 
evidence to law enforcement. For example, if the lawyer was holding the 
307. See infra Part IV.E. 
308. See supra Parts II.C.2 & D. 
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evidence at the very point in time that a search warrant was executed at 
the client’s home or that police searched the site where the item was 
originally located, then returning the item to its original location 
afterward is effectively a form of concealment. 
If, contrary to the above analysis, a jurisdiction does insist that 
disclosure of real evidence to law enforcement must follow any 
possession of it, then the lawyer ordinarily would have to avoid any 
examination beyond the most passive observation.309 As Rodney Uphoff 
predicts, “[z]ealous defense lawyers will be extremely reluctant to take 
possession of evidentiary items at all, if doing so always requires 
disclosure to the authorities.”310 And, as discussed previously, the lawyer 
thereby may be unable to effectively prepare for the defense and must 
rely on dubious government-controlled forensics testing. 
3. Preserving Confidentiality if Defense Lawyer Delivers Evidence to 
Law Enforcement 
If the lawyer must deliver real evidence to the authorities,311 Standard 
4-4.6(c) of the ABA’s Standards for Criminal Justice directs that it be 
done in the manner “best designed to protect the client’s interests.”312 
When possible, and when it matters, the lawyer should arrange for 
anonymous delivery through another person or perhaps the local bar 
association,313 an ingenious option put into practice by the District of 
Columbia Office of Bar Counsel.314 But if the lawyer has removed the 
item from a location that itself has evidentiary value, then failing to 
disclose as much could be regarded as concealing evidence (which is all 
the more reason to permit the item to be returned to the original 
location). 
If anonymous delivery is not available or practically effective, the 
prosecution and the lawyer should make appropriate arrangements for 
introduction and authentication of the evidence in a manner that 
preserves client confidences as much as possible. As suggested in the 
comment to the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, to avoid 
309. Uphoff, supra note 115, at 1190 (noting that, if California case law requires turning over real 
evidence sua sponte, then a competent lawyer must refuse to retrieve the evidence rather than ensure 
that the prosecution gains access to it). 
310. Id. at 1213. 
311. But see supra Part IV.B.2. 
312. STANDARDS FOR CRIM. JUST. § 4-4.6(a)(1), (a)(2), (d) (1993). 
313. Id. § 4-4.6 cmt.; see also Uphoff, supra note 115, at 1199, 1221. 
314. See RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4, cmt. 5 (D.C. Bar Ass’n 2014). 
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prejudice to the client and to preserve attorney-client confidentiality, the 
material or items should be admitted into evidence at the trial “without 
improperly revealing the source of the evidence to the finder of fact.”315 
The proposed revision to Standard 4-4.7 of the ABA Standards for 
Criminal Justice recently approved by the section council recommends, 
“the prosecution should be prohibited from presenting testimony or 
argument identifying or implying the defense as the source of the 
evidence, except where the defense objects to introduction of such 
evidence for lack of foundation.”316 
Still, the value of such arrangements for the client should not be 
overstated, nor should the duty to deliver to law enforcement be casually 
accepted on the assumption such protections in introduction of evidence 
will mitigate harm to the defendant. As Stephen Gillers notes, 
withholding the identity of the source of the item “may be small comfort 
to the client if the thing itself must be turned over and can implicate the 
client in a crime (e.g., if it’s the victim’s wallet containing the client’s 
fingerprints).”317 
In the classic California case of People v. Meredith,318 based on a 
confidential communication by the client with the lawyer, an agent of 
the lawyer retrieved a wallet, which had belonged to the victim of a 
robbery and homicide, from a burn barrel located near the defendant’s 
home. The lawyer examined the contents of the wallet to confirm it was 
the victim’s, and then turned it over to the police. By removing it from 
the original location, the lawyer of course had altered the evidence; it 
was as if the wallet “bore a tag bearing the words ‘located in the trash 
can by [defendant’s] residence,’” and the lawyer, “by taking the wallet, 
destroyed this tag.”319 Thus, under those circumstances, the prosecutor 
was entitled to bring to the jury’s attention that the wallet had been 
found in that particular location. In an important footnote, the California 
Supreme Court advised: 
[T]he defendant may be willing to enter a stipulation which will 
simply inform the jury as to the relevant location or condition of 
the evidence in question. When such a stipulation is proffered, 
the prosecution should not be permitted to reject the stipulation 
in the hope that by requiring defense counsel personally to 
testify to such facts, the jury might infer that counsel learned 
315. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 119, cmt. c (2000). 
316. Proposed Revision to Standard 4-4.7(j)(ii), supra note 124. 
317. GILLERS, supra note 296, at 249. 
318. 631 P.2d 46 (1981). 
319. Id. at 53. 
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those facts from defendant.320 
C. Evidence Delivered to Defense Lawyer 
Even when a lawyer has not affirmatively taken possession of real 
evidence of a possible crime to examine it, such evidence nonetheless 
may find its way into the lawyer’s hands by being delivered to the 
lawyer by a client or another person. 
A lawyer should not counsel another person, whether a client or 
otherwise, to remove evidence from its original location if to do so 
would effectively destroy or alter the evidence, including forensic 
characteristics that a trained criminal investigator could discover. Thus, 
for example, the lawyer should not direct a client to return to the scene 
of a crime and carry away objects that were present there, even for the 
purported purpose of examining the object in the lawyer’s office, 
because such removal probably could not be accomplished without 
altering material characteristics of the scene or the evidentiary object. If 
the lawyer wishes to exercise the right to examine the evidence,321 the 
lawyer herself should make proper arrangements for doing so. 
By contrast, if the evidence is already in the client’s immediate 
possession or is located in a place where it may be retrieved without 
changing evidentiary qualities (such as the client’s home or office), the 
lawyer may ask to see it or ask the client to retrieve it. For example, the 
lawyer may ask the client to take documents out of the client’s files for 
delivery to the lawyer for examination and to make copies. If the client 
did remove evidence from the scene (perhaps prior to receiving a 
lawyer’s contrary advice) or the evidence has always been in the client’s 
possession, and the client then delivers it to the lawyer, the lawyer may 
accept temporary possession of that evidence for examination purposes 
as discussed above.322 Disposition of the evidence afterward is a more 
complex question, as addressed above and below.323 
When the lawyer has received evidence from a client or other person, 
the American Bar Association’s Standards for Criminal Justice state that 
the lawyer may be permitted to return the evidence to the person who 
delivered it, while counseling that person regarding the illegality of 
320. Id. at 54 n.8; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 119 
cmt. c (2000) (“The parties may also agree that the tribunal may instruct the jury, without revealing 
the lawyer’s involvement, that an appropriate chain of possession links the evidence to the place 
where it was located before coming into the lawyer’s possession.”). 
321. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
322. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
323. See supra Part IV.B.2; infra Part IV.E. 
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concealing, altering, or destroying that evidence after taking it back.324 
By this guideline, the lawyer must seriously impress upon the client or 
other person who brought the evidence to the lawyer that hiding the 
item, destroying it, or changing its evidentiary characteristics might 
constitute obstruction of justice, assuming that the item has potential 
evidentiary value to a reasonably anticipated criminal proceeding.325 In 
explaining to a client the legal consequences of retaining or destroying 
the evidence, the lawyer may also offer “any good-faith arguments for 
contesting the validity or applicability of the law to the client’s 
situation.”326 
However, leading authorities place important limitations on the 
lawyer’s ability to return evidence to the person who delivered it. First, 
the evidence can be returned to the person who delivered it only if that 
person also is the rightful owner or possessor.327 Thus, if a client or other 
person delivers to the lawyer material that not only is evidence of a 
crime but which has been taken from another, such as stolen property, 
the lawyer is obliged to see that these materials are either presented to 
law enforcement or are restored to the rightful owner from whom they 
were wrongfully taken (which can be accomplished anonymously).328 
Not only is retention of stolen goods a crime, but it could be criminal 
misconduct for “the lawyer, once having taken possession of the goods, 
to return them to the thief.”329 Geoffrey Hazard and William Hodes state 
that the lawyer has “no right to delay return of the fruits of crime to their 
rightful owners.”330 
Second, even when the person who delivered the evidence to the 
lawyer is the rightful possessor, the ABA Standards provide that the 
lawyer may not return the evidence to that person if the lawyer 
reasonably fears that evidence will be unlawfully destroyed or altered.331 
324. STANDARDS FOR CRIM. JUST. § 4-4.6(b) (1993). 
325. On the duty to preserve and not destroy evidence, see supra Part II. 
326. Joy & McMunigal, supra note 37, at 44. 
327. See RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(a) (D.C. Bar Ass’n 2014) (providing that when a 
lawyer receives physical evidence that belongs to someone other than the client, “the lawyer shall 
make a good faith effort to preserve it and to return it to the owner”). 
328. STANDARDS FOR CRIM. JUST. § 4-4.6 cmt. 
329. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 45 cmt. f (2000). 
330. 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 295, § 30.5, at 30-14. 
331. STANDARDS FOR CRIM. JUST. § 4-4.6(c); see also Hitch v. Superior Court, 708 P.2d 72, 78 
(Ariz. 1985) (en banc) (“[I]f the attorney reasonably believes that evidence will not be destroyed, he 
may return it to the source, explaining the laws on concealment and destruction.”). The proposed 
revision to Standard 4-4.7 approved by the ABA section council in early 2014 would provide that 
counsel may take possession of evidence when counsel fears that the evidence would be destroyed, 
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If the lawyer has reason to believe that the client or other person will not 
treat the evidence with respect, then Standard 4-4.6(c) states that the 
lawyer may not return it to the source heedless to its likely destruction or 
concealment.332 In most cases involving an ordinary street crime then, 
the lawyer would not act reasonably under Standard 4-4.6(c) in returning 
evidence plainly indicating illegal conduct, such as the instrumentalities 
of the crime or clothing stained with blood, to the apparent perpetrator, 
who almost certainly would conceal or destroy it. 
But the assumption that the lawyer’s fear of possible destruction by 
another, even over the lawyer’s contrary advice, imposes a duty to retain 
the evidence should be questioned. The lawyer had no duty to accept the 
evidence in the first instance, even for temporary examination. And the 
lawyer “does not have a corresponding duty to preserve incriminating 
evidence not in her possession or control.”333 Since returning it to the 
person who delivered it to the lawyer initially would simply restore the 
status quo that existed before taking temporary possession, one should 
wonder why the lawyer would be obliged to retain it even though she 
reasonably fears that it may be destroyed.334 To be sure, the lawyer 
should counsel the person to whom it is returned about the legal duty to 
preserve and not conceal evidence (under the law of obstruction of 
justice).335 But the lawyer’s temporary examination of the evidence 
should not so easily be converted into a duty to take permanent 
possession of it, even to prevent its destruction or concealment by 
someone else—especially if the (mistaken) conventional assumption 
prevails that a lawyer taking possession of evidence must then deliver it 
to law enforcement. 
In any event, when a business client has shared documents with the 
lawyer that are arguably relevant to an alleged financial crime, returning 
the documents with the instruction that they should be placed back in the 
client’s files is appropriate, at least provided the lawyer has a reasonable 
basis for believing the client will comply. In addition, the lawyer could 
retain copies of those documents, with the client’s understanding that, 
should the client conceal or destroy them, the lawyer might be obliged to 
but does not appear to impose a requirement. Proposed Revision to Standard 4-4.7(d)(i), supra note 
124. Again, the assumption here is that the real evidence is pertinent to a pending or reasonably 
anticipated criminal investigation or proceeding and thus may not be lawfully destroyed. On the 
duty to preserve and not destroy evidence, see supra Part II.A. 
332. STANDARDS FOR CRIM. JUST. § 4-4.6(c). 
333. Uphoff, supra note 115, at 1203. 
334. Gillers, supra note 3, at 847. 
335. See supra Parts II & III. 
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provide those copies to law enforcement. With respect to any real 
evidence and for the purpose of memorializing the matter in the event of 
later inquiry, the ABA’s Standards for Criminal Justice direct the 
lawyer to prepare a written record for the lawyer’s files of the item and 
its return to the source.336 
Third, under the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, the lawyer 
should not return an item to the client or other person if the lawyer 
“reasonably fears that return of the item to the source will result in 
physical harm to anyone.”337 Thus, for example, the lawyer 
understandably will be reluctant to return a weapon to a client if the 
lawyer has a reasonable basis to believe that the weapon has been or 
may be used in a crime. Toxic substances, even if legal to possess, 
likewise ought not be left in the hands of a person without appropriate 
training and equipment to handle them safely. 
Fourth, for obvious reasons and as discussed in a separate part below, 
the lawyer ordinarily may not simply return contraband items to a client 
for continued possession, because the client’s restored possession of the 
item may be unlawful.338 
If the lawyer must turn over real evidence to law enforcement when it 
cannot be returned to the person who delivered it, then the lawyer 
generally should decline to accept such evidence in the first instance. By 
declining to accept real evidence, the lawyer takes on no responsibility 
for its preservation or disposition,339 and thus no conceivable duty to act 
against the client’s interests by handing the evidence over to law 
enforcement. To be sure, the lawyer ought to warn the continuing 
possessor about the consequences of retaining or destroying it and the 
legal significance of real evidence. 
Whenever the lawyer is unable to return items to the source or to the 
rightful owner and is obliged to deliver the item to law enforcement, the 
lawyer ought to take steps to protect the client’s confidentiality by 
withholding information about the source of the evidence.340 As Charles 
Wolfram observes, while courts frequently have obliged lawyers to turn 
over evidence to law enforcement, “courts have drawn the line at the 
turn-over obligation . . . and have generally protected the lawyer’s 
information about the source of the incriminating evidence if that source 
336. STANDARDS FOR CRIM. JUST. § 4-4.6(b). 
337. Id. § 4-4.6(b). 
338. See infra Part IV. 
339. Gillers, supra note 3, at 855–56. 
340. See supra Part IV.B.3. 
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is the lawyer’s client.”341 As the Washington Supreme Court stated in 
State v. Olwell,342 an early decision on this subject, “the state, when 
attempting to introduce such evidence at the trial, should take extreme 
precautions to make certain that the source of the evidence is not 
disclosed in the presence of the jury and prejudicial error is not 
committed.”343 
D. The Tricky Problem of Contraband 
Both the ABA (in the Standards for Criminal Justice) and the 
American Law Institute (in comments to the pertinent section of the 
Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers) take the position that a 
lawyer may take temporary possession of contraband as part of his 
professional duties in representing a client. The Standards for Criminal 
Justice generally permit a lawyer to “receive” an item of physical 
evidence for, among others reasons, “to test, examine, inspect, or use the 
item in any way as part of defense counsel’s representation of the 
client.”344 While the lawyer then has a duty to either destroy the item or 
notify law enforcement when the item is contraband,345 the initial 
reception of it for examination falls under the general permissive rule. 
The Restatement comment states that as long as the lawyer’s possession 
of materials is for the purposes of examining or testing physical 
evidence of a possible client crime, “criminal laws that generally 
prohibit possession of contraband or other evidence of crimes are 
inapplicable to the lawyer.”346 
Provided the lawyer holds it only for a short duration and only to 
confirm its nature, this is a sensible approach. Indeed, with respect to 
most items, that the item truly is contraband would not be certain until 
after some objective examination, even if it appears from a first-glance 
to be an item the possession of which is prohibited. Thus, what appears 
to be cocaine could be an innocuous white powder; what appears to be 
child pornography could be depictions of a young-looking adult. 
The more difficult question is what to do with the contraband after 
examination. The conventional wisdom is that when “an object is 
contraband . . . the obligation to turn it over to law enforcement is self-
341. WOLFRAM, supra note 259, § 12.3.5, at 645. 
342. 64 Wash. 2d 828, 394 P.2d 681 (1964). 
343. Id. at 685. 
344. STANDARDS FOR CRIM. JUST. § 4-4.6(c)(4) (1993). 
345. Id. § 4-4.6(d). 
346. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 119 cmt. b (2000). 
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executing, and no prosecution motion or court order is required.”347 But 
the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice are more nuanced:  
If such destruction is not permitted by law or if in defense 
counsel’s judgment he or she cannot retain the item, whether or 
not it is contraband, in a way that does not pose an unreasonable 
risk of physical harm to anyone, defense counsel should disclose 
the location of or should deliver the item to law enforcement 
authorities.348  
The Standards thereby suggest that the lawyer’s judgment on whether to 
retain or disclose the item turns, not on whether it is contraband (unless 
it is destroyed as not relevant evidence), but on whether counsel may 
otherwise retain the item. In sum, the Standards contemplate the same 
analysis that would apply generally to a lawyer’s disposal of evidence 
after examination.349 
In a professional disciplinary proceeding, the Montana Supreme 
Court, citing to the Standards, approved a lawyer’s taking possession of 
contraband for purposes of examination. In the case of In re Olson,350 a 
lawyer for a criminal defendant accused of possession of child 
pornography was contacted by the client’s mother who suggested there 
were items in the client’s apartment that the lawyer should view.351 The 
lawyer went the apartment and took possession of photographs, which 
depicted naked young children in erotic poses.352 Although the lawyer 
testified that he did not believe the photographs constituted child 
pornography, the court later stated that it was “difficult . . . to 
comprehend how anyone would not ‘know’ that these are examples of 
child pornography.”353 Nonetheless, even assuming the photographs 
were child pornography, the court concluded that the lawyer had 
engaged in no misconduct, recognizing that he “had a duty to conduct an 
investigation on behalf of his client and prepare a defense.”354 Moreover, 
the Olson court noted that, while the state had not formally adopted 
them, the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice were properly relied on 
347. Jenness, supra note 220, at 18. 
348. STANDARDS FOR CRIM. JUST. § 4-4.6(d). 
349. See supra Part III.B.2. 
350. 222 P.3d 632 (Mont. 2009). For a thoughtful and complete discussion of Olson, see Uphoff, 
supra note 115, at 1204–09.  
351. Olson, 222 P.3d at 634. 
352. Id. 
353. Id. at 638. 
354. Id. 
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“for guidance in analyzing this matter.”355 
With the disciplinary commission in Olson characterizing the 
lawyer’s conduct as “a ‘text book example’ of the type of functioning 
expected of defense counsel,”356 it is important to outline the careful 
steps this conscientious professional took in handling this contraband.357 
First, from the apartment scene, the items were tagged and sealed and 
then were securely locked in the lawyer’s office.358 Second, the lawyer 
obtained an ex parte protective order from a state judge authorizing him 
to retain possession of the items, in the event someone might consider 
them to be contraband.359 
Although Olson stands as solid precedent for the proposition that a 
lawyer may take temporary possession of contraband evidence to 
examine it as part of a criminal defense investigation, the decision is 
unclear about what should happen afterward. In Olson, the lawyer 
retained the evidence in his office (sealed and under lock) until a 
replacement lawyer later took over the case and delivered the 
photographs to the prosecution.360 The dissent insisted that the evidence 
should have been made available to the prosecutor and that the lawyer 
had wrongly concealed it.361 The majority sidesteps the question of 
when, if ever, a lawyer should disclose the evidence.362 The court stated 
that the lawyer did not, “at that point in the proceedings” have a duty to 
turn over the information and concluded there was “no evidence in this 
record of [the lawyer’s] intent to tamper with or fabricate physical 
evidence.”363 
With respect to the proper disposition of the evidence after 
examination, the circumstances presented in the Olson case may be 
unusual. The evidence could not be returned to the apartment, not only 
because that might be restoring someone to wrongful possession of 
contraband, but because the client apparently remained in custody and 
355. Id. 
356. Id. at 637. 
357. Uphoff, supra note 115, at 1204 (describing Olson as an example of “the conscientious 
criminal defense lawyer when dealing with contraband”). 
358. Olson, 222 P.3d at 638. 
359. Id. at 635. 
360. Id. at 635–36. 
361. Id. at 640 (Nelson, J., dissenting). 
362. Uphoff, supra note 115, at 1207 (“The majority did not indicate whether Olson would have 
been obligated to turn over the evidence sua sponte at some point, even without a court order.”). 
363. Olson, 222 P.3d at 638. 
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the landlord was evicting her from the apartment.364 The police had 
already searched and released the apartment, without taking the subject 
photographs.365 And during the successful federal prosecution of the 
client, the photographs were never used, as most of those photographs 
had already been found elsewhere and were simply unnecessary to 
prosecute and convict.366 In sum, as Rodney Uphoff concludes in his 
thoughtful dissection of the Olson case, “the authorities already had full 
access to this evidence and, for whatever reason, decided not to take 
possession of the items.”367 Thus, Olson cannot be cited in general 
support for a lawyer taking permanent possession of evidence, 
contraband or not, at least without steps to ensure that law enforcement 
could find the evidence through an ordinary investigation. 
When a lawyer does conclude that contraband must be delivered to 
law enforcement, the lawyer should act carefully and with forethought. 
To avoid transporting such material with the possibility that it might be 
lost or that the lawyer would be stopped while holding it, the lawyer 
probably should not attempt a direct delivery to law enforcement and 
should instead notify authorities to come to the lawyer’s office to secure 
the contraband evidence. 
E. Defense Lawyer’s Retention of Evidence with Contingent Notice to 
Law Enforcement (and the Gillers Proposal for a Registry for Real 
Potential Evidence) 
The conventional wisdom has been that a lawyer may not retain 
possession of evidence of a crime beyond the time reasonably necessary 
to examine and test it. As this presumption is often expressed, the lawyer 
should not become “a depository for criminal evidence.”368 Moreover, 
the prevailing but largely unexamined precedent holds that the lawyer 
must turn over real evidence to the prosecution, even if received directly 
from a client.369 
364. Id. at 634. 
365. Id. 
366. Id. at 636. 
367. Uphoff, supra note 115, at 1207. 
368. State v. Olwell, 64 Wash. 2d 828, 833, 394 P.2d 681, 684 (1964). 
369. See Morrell v. State, 575 P.2d 1200, 1210–11 (Alaska 1978). But see RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 3.4 cmt. 7 (D.C. Bar. Ass’n 2014) (stating that when the lawyer has received physical 
evidence for examination or testing, the lawyer may return the property to the client, unless it would 
be contraband or belongs to someone else). For a powerful critique of the assumption that a criminal 
defense lawyer must deliver evidence to the prosecution, as stated in decisions such as Olwell and 
Morrell, see Reitz, supra note 299, at 584–613. 
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Stephen Gillers, one of the nation’s leading figures in professional 
responsibility, writing in an important article on this subject, submits 
that on this question, “the courts have it wrong.”370 The “nearly 
unanimous belief” that a lawyer who takes possession of real evidence 
either for examination or because it was delivered by someone (and 
return was not proper or possible) must thereafter deliver it directly to 
law enforcement is simply “wrong.”371 
In saying the conventional wisdom is wrong, Gillers has it exactly 
right. First, the assumption that law enforcement is entitled to receipt of 
evidence that it would not otherwise have discovered on its own is 
impossible to square with zealous advocacy by a defense lawyer as a 
professional responsibility, protection of the confidentiality of client 
communications, the client’s constitutional right against self-
incrimination, and the guarantee to defendants of effective assistance of 
counsel.372 To be sure, the real evidence itself—that is, the object—is 
not protected by privilege. But the client’s description of where the 
evidence is located certainly is privileged,373 as is the client’s 
communicative act of delivering evidence to his lawyer and any forced 
act of production by the lawyer to law enforcement.374 
In sum, the criminal defendant’s right to have counsel investigate and 
examine real evidence375 is compromised, and probably must be 
abandoned, if the lawyer knows that exercising that right will redound to 
the client’s detriment when the evidence afterward must be laid at the 
doorstep of the prosecution.376 But, as Kevin Reitz puts it, suspects in 
criminal matters should not be penalized for hiring lawyers who then 
“must behave as government agents or informants, providing client-
incriminating evidence and information to prosecutors.”377 
Second, imposing a mandatory duty of delivery after the lawyer takes 
possession of real evidence is not in the public interest, even aside from 
the criminal defendant’s constitutional privilege and right to effective 
370. Gillers, supra note 3, at 846. 
371. Id. 
372. See supra Part IV.B.2. 
373. See supra Part IV.A. 
374. GILLERS, supra note 35, at 242; see also Lefstein, supra note 270, at 903 (“It follows that if 
a client actually gives evidence to an attorney while seeking legal advice, the attorney-client 
privilege should protect the information implicitly communicated by the client’s act, namely, the 
fact that the client has possessed the evidence.”).  
375. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
376. See supra Part IV.B.2. 
377. Reitz, supra note 299, at 573. 
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representation that includes a full defense investigation. When real 
evidence is at risk of being destroyed, when an item may pose a public 
danger (such as a loaded gun left in a public place), or when stolen 
property may disappear beyond recovery, the lawyer who takes 
possession of that real evidence and thereby preserves, disarms, and 
returns it has served a genuine public service.378 But, as Gillers writes, 
“[b]y commanding turnover whenever a lawyer chooses to receive and 
cannot (or is not allowed) to return an item, the courts discourage 
lawyers from protecting these public interests if doing so will harm their 
clients.”379 
The difficulty lies in realizing these apparently conflicting goals in a 
manner that prevents the harm to the state interest posed by a lawyer 
effectively concealing real evidence, while encouraging the lawyer to 
take possession of real evidence in a manner that does not betray the 
client’s interests. For those few cases in which the lawyer cannot return 
the real evidence and law enforcement does not know the identity of the 
lawyer for the suspect, the solution proposed by Gillers is creation of a 
new evidence registry.380 The lawyer would record that she represented a 
client, thereby notifying law enforcement of that representation if and 
when the client comes under investigation. As previously proposed by 
Kevin Reitz, law enforcement then would serve a court-approved 
subpoena on the lawyer, who then would be obliged to either turn over 
any real evidence being held that is identified by law enforcement with 
reasonable particularity or seek court suppression of the subpoena or 
search.381 
The elegance of the Gillers solution lies in its simultaneous respect 
for the premises that “neither the client nor the Government [should be 
left] worse off than he or it would be if the evidence had remained in the 
client’s or a third person’s possession or in a location known to the 
lawyer (e.g., the loaded gun in the woods).”382 If law enforcement never 
conducts an investigation or never searches for the evidence (or perhaps 
never searches in the right location), then the real evidence remains 
undiscovered and the client’s communication with the lawyer remains 
sealed. But if law enforcement does conduct an investigation that would 
uncover the evidence, the lawyer’s retention of it does not amount to 
378. Gillers, supra note 3, at 848–51. 
379. Id. at 851. 
380. Id. at 862. 
381. Reitz, supra note 299, at 655–58; Gillers, supra note 3, at 861–62. 
382. See Gillers, supra note 3, at 829, 863–64. 
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concealment and the lawyer is then obliged to respond lawfully to a 
subpoena. 
However, in our imperfect world, the wisdom of a solution does not 
translate into the likelihood of its adoption. Because the current 
expectation that a lawyer cough up any evidence retained for 
examination or not returnable to the source produces a windfall to the 
government, law enforcement agencies and prosecutors may well resist 
any alternative. And even if a state or two does act to establish a registry, 
the patchwork of differing expectations among the states (and the federal 
government) will leave many a lawyer dangling from an ethical noose, 
especially if a matter extends across state borders or if the choice of state 
or federal criminal jurisdiction cannot be readily predicted. 
In meantime, however, there are other ways by which we could move 
in the direction of upholding professional responsibilities without 
improperly impeding law enforcement: 
First, the mistaken presumption that a lawyer may not return evidence 
to its original location, even if forensic characteristics have been altered, 
should be overturned. As discussed earlier, as long as the lawyer 
provides some type of notice at the location itself as to the availability of 
a forensics report, the lawyer has acted properly to examine evidence 
and has taken no action to obstruct any criminal investigation.383 
Second, if a lawyer does choose to take the bold step of openly 
retaining evidence in the confident expectation that the client will 
certainly know if any search or subpoena is directed at the client, then 
the lawyer should be permitted to act at that time to notify law 
enforcement that evidence is being held and not be accused of 
concealment. 
In either event, the lawyer should create a record that the purpose of 
holding the evidence is not concealment, such as by creating a 
contemporaneous written document explaining the decision made to 
retain the evidence, the lawyer’s plan for ensuring that he will be alerted 
to any search or interrogation of the client as a suspect, and how law 
enforcement would be notified at the appropriate time. And the lawyer 
probably should ensure that this record is confidentially shared with 
other respected lawyers in the community who can later vouch that these 
steps were considered professional judgments and not post hoc 
inventions after being caught holding the evidence. 
Returning to the subject of obstruction of justice discussed earlier in 
383. See supra Part IV.B.2. 
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this Article, this is a specific intent crime.384 And the federal criminal 
statute includes a safe harbor for actions taken by a lawyer in 
representing a client in a proceeding.385 As one state court puts it, “[t]he 
main rationale for the rule requiring disclosure of the fruits and 
instrumentalities of the crime when taken into possession by the lawyer 
is that a lawyer must not impede or inhibit the discovery of evidence by 
the state.”386 Thus, a lawyer who forthrightly acts by holding evidence in 
a manner that does not conceal it from law enforcement if and when an 
investigation is actually initiated and a search or subpoena is 
forthcoming is not legitimately subject to prosecution and has 
contravened no ethical constraint.387 The ABA Standards for Criminal 
Justice arguably contemplate this possibility by providing that “[i]f 
defense counsel retains the item, he or she should retain it in his or her 
law office in a manner that does not impede the lawful ability of law 
enforcement authorities to obtain the item.”388 However, unless the 
courts act to suspend abusive prosecutions, lawyers understandably will 
be reluctant to boldly act as zealous advocates with respect to possession 
of real evidence. And our legal system will remain the poorer for it. 
Finally, as Norman Lefstein advises, “retention of physical evidence 
by counsel should be the exceptional case, not an everyday event.”389 A 
lawyer who chooses to retain real evidence undertakes a weighty 
responsibility, although that may simply follow from the increasingly 
weighty responsibilities of criminal defense lawyers in an era where 
missteps may draw prosecutorial attention and public forensics labs are 
of dubious reliability. As noted earlier, the lawyer certainly must treat 
the evidence in accordance with reasonable forensic standards and with 
careful documentation of the chain of evidence.390 The lawyer must 
ensure that evidence is stored in a secure manner, both to ward against 
abuse by employees and the possibility of theft by outsiders. And the 
384. See supra Part II.C.2. 
385. See supra Part II.D. 
386. Wemark v. State, 602 N.W.2d 810, 816 (Iowa 1999). 
387. See Green, supra note 9, at 361 (“For example, a lawyer who puts evidence in a drawer with 
the intent to safeguard it until it must be produced presumably would not be guilty of obstruction, 
while a lawyer who engaged in the same conduct with the intent of hiding the evidence permanently 
from criminal investigators probably would be.”). 
388. STANDARDS FOR CRIM. JUST. § 4-4.6(c) (1993). 
389. Lefstein, supra note 270, at 933. 
390. The proposed revision to Standard 4-4.7 approved by the ABA section council in early 2014 
states that “[c]ounsel should keep the evidence in counsel’s office separate from privileged 
materials of other clients and preserve it in a manner that will not impair its evidentiary value.” 
Proposed Revision to Standard 4-4.7(i), supra note 124. 
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passage of time must also be addressed, including what happens if many 
months or years go by without a criminal investigation (that is, when 
does the duty to retain rather than destroy the evidence expire), the 
lawyer retires (that is, how is deposited evidence transferred to other 
stewards), or the evidence is perishable and deteriorates while being 
held. 
V. HOW MAY THE LAWYER ENGAGE WITH REAL 
EVIDENCE? A CASE ILLUSTRATION 
A. The Case of the Bloody Knife Under the Stairs (Wemark v. State) 
1. The Death of Melissa Wemark and the Arrest of Robert Wemark 
On January 19, 1993, Winneshiek County sheriff’s deputies were 
called for a second time to a residence owned by Robert Wemark, age 
51, in the small village of Ridgeway in northeast Iowa.391 Inside the 
house, Robert’s adult daughter by an earlier marriage had discovered the 
body of Melissa Ann Casper Wemark, 32, the estranged wife of her 
father.392 Law enforcement had visited the home the previous day after 
Melissa had failed to arrive at a friend’s house.393 No one had answered 
the door and her car was not parked there.394 
After ten years of marriage and three children together, Melissa had 
filed for divorce from Robert the previous October.395 The day before 
her body was discovered, Melissa had gone to Robert Wemark’s 
Ridgway residence to pick up Robbie from the child’s father after 
delivering their other two young children to school.396 The previous 
night, Robert had told Melissa that he was lonely and wanted one of the 
children to spend the night with him.397 
The body of Melissa was found under a pile of blankets in a 
391. Ken MacAdam, Autopsy: Woman Died of Multiple Stab Wounds, WATERLOO COURIER, Jan. 
22, 1993, at A7. 
392. Id.; Jack Swanson, Wemark’s Daughter Tearfully Testifies at Trial, OELWEIN DAILY 
REGISTER, June 24, 1993, at 1. 
393. Jack Swanson, Wemark Murder was “Crime of Passion,” OELWEIN DAILY REGISTER, June 
23, 1993, at 1. 
394. Jack Swanson, Daughters Testify in Wemark Trial, OELWEIN DAILY REGISTER, June 29, 
1993, at 1. 
395. Jack Swanson, Melissa Wemark’s Mother Testifies at Murder Trial, OELWEIN DAILY 
REGISTER, June 23, 1993, at 1. 
396. MacAdam, supra note 391, at A7; Swanson, supra note 395, at 1. 
397. Swanson, supra note 395, at 1. 
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bedroom.398 Based on the perforated condition of the body, Melissa 
appeared to have been shot several times, but an autopsy later revealed 
she had died of multiple stab wounds.399 She had been stabbed fifteen 
times.400 Although the injuries were horrendous, Melissa had not died 
immediately and, with “prompt medical attention, she could have 
survived.”401 
Missing from the home was both Robert Wemark and the couple’s 
three-year-old son, Robbie.402 
At about the same time that deputies were discovering the body of 
Melissa in Ridgeway, a motorist on a gravel county road noticed bloody 
clothing strewn along the drive to a farmhouse in northwest Iowa, about 
165 miles away.403 Dickinson County sheriff’s deputies went to a 
farmhouse whose owners were in Florida and found broken windows.404 
Inside, they found Robert lying on the floor, still conscious but badly 
wounded from an apparently self-inflicted gunshot wound to the 
chest.405 Robert had several other cuts and scratches on his abdomen and 
chest.406 The toddler Robbie was playing on the floor nearby, 
uninjured.407 
In great pain, Robert Wemark told the deputies he had “gotten into a 
fight with his wife,” who had “come at him with a knife.”408 He claimed 
that during the struggle she had fallen back on the knife.409 After driving 
Melissa’s car to the other side of the state,410 he had shot himself in the 
chest and accidentally in the foot.411 
Robert Wemark was arrested at the hospital in Sioux Falls, South 
Dakota, where he underwent surgery for a bullet wound that had pierced 
398. Swanson, supra note 392, at 1. 
399. MacAdam, supra note 391, at A7. 
400. Jack Swanson, Notes May Reveal Wemark’s State of Mind, OELWEIN DAILY REGISTER, June 
25, 1993, at 1. 
401. Wemark v. Iowa, No. C00-2023- MWB, 2002 WL 1724022, at *1 (N.D. Iowa Mar. 6, 
2002). 
402. MacAdam, supra note 391, at A7. 
403. Id. at A7. 
404. Swanson, supra note 392, at 1. 
405. MacAdam, supra note 391, at A7; Swanson, supra note 393, at 1. 
406. Swanson, supra note 393, at 1. 
407. MacAdam, supra note 391, at A7. 
408. Swanson, supra note 392, at 1. 
409. Id. at 1. 
410. Swanson, supra note 394, at 1. 
411. Swanson, supra note 392, at 1. 
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part of his heart.412 After being returned to Winneshiek County, Robert 
was charged with first-degree murder.413 
2. The Search of Robert Wemark’s Residence 
A two-day search of the Ridgeway home pursuant to a warrant found 
indications that the home had been cleaned of blood on the floor and that 
Robert apparently had washed his clothes.414 Law enforcement found a 
family photo on the refrigerator with Melissa’s face scratched out, along 
with a note saying, “I cannot live without Missy . . . . I will always be 
with Missy. I cannot live by myself. Forgive me. I will always love her. 
Take care of Robbie.”415 On a Father’s Day card from Melissa, Robert 
had written “You are as low as a snake,” “Go to hell,” and “You’re 
dead.”416 
No weapon was found. Law enforcement unsurprisingly found 
several knives in the kitchen, but none of them had human blood on the 
blades.417 The basement of the home was never searched.418 
3. Robert Wemark Tells His Lawyers the Location of the Knife and Is 
Advised to Disclose the Location 
Robert Wemark’s lead defense attorney was a two-decade veteran of 
the criminal bar and a former prosecutor.419 Two years after the Wemark 
trial, he would be appointed to the Iowa trial bench in Des Moines. He 
was assisted on the case by another two-decade veteran criminal trial 
attorney and former prosecutor.420 
In confidence to his defense counsel, Wemark revealed that he had 
hidden the knife in the basement of the home under automobile parts.421 
Not sure that they could trust their client, both lawyers went to the home 
412. MacAdam, supra note 391, at A7; Swanson, supra note 393, at 1. 
413. Autopsy: Decorah Woman Died of Stab Wounds, OELWEIN DAILY REGISTER, Jan. 23, 1993, 
at 1. 
414. Amy Davis, Wemark Jury Sees ‘You’re Dead’ Notation, WATERLOO COURIER, June 25, 
1993, at A4; Swanson, supra note 393, at 1; Swanson, supra note 400, at 1. 
415. Jack Swanson & Amy Wainwright, New Evidence Submitted in Wemark Trial, OELWEIN 
DAILY REGISTER, June 24, 1993, at 1. 
416. Davis, supra note 414, at A4. 
417. Swanson, supra note 400, at 1. 
418. Swanson, supra note 393, at 1. 
419. Robert J. Blink in West Legal Directory. 
420. Attorneys, SANDY L. FIRM, http://www.sandylawpractice.com/attorneys-jls.html (last visited 
Sept. 15, 2014). 
421. Appellant’s Brief at 4, Wemark v. State, 602 N.W.2d 810 (Iowa 1999) (No. 98-586). 
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in Ridgeway.422 Without removing anything, they observed that the 
knife was indeed in the basement where Wemark had said it would be.423 
Wemark’s counsel contacted a chief judge of the state trial court in 
another county as well as experienced criminal defense lawyers for 
advice based on hypothetical facts, all of whom confirmed there was an 
ethical problem.424 Believing that the disclosure from Wemark put them 
in an ethical quandary, the lawyers concluded that they had only three 
options: (1) wait to see if law enforcement would search the house again, 
which was highly unlikely; (2) have a third person reveal the location of 
the knife to law enforcement without identifying the source of the 
information; or (3) encourage Wemark to disclose the location of the 
knife himself to someone affiliated with law enforcement.425 
In preparation for the trial, Wemark’s defense counsel had been 
considering the possibility of a diminished capacity defense.426 
However, after having him examined by their own expert, who 
concluded that Wemark was capable of deliberate premeditation, they 
realized this possibility was negligible.427 Nonetheless, rather than 
abandoning the defense, the lawyers decided to have Robert Wemark 
meet with the state’s psychiatrist.428 Having encouraged Wemark to be 
very truthful, counsel expected he would disclose the location of the 
knife to the state’s medical expert who in turn would report to the 
prosecution.429 
And that is precisely how events unfolded. Based on the report of 
Wemark’s confession to the state psychiatrist that he had hidden the 
knife, the state searched the home again.430 
The lock-blade hunting knife with a four-inch blade was found by 
422. Appellee’s Brief at 10, Wemark v. State, 322 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir. 2003) (No. 02-1755) 
(quoting deposition). 
423. Id. 
424. Wemark v. State, 602 N.W.2d 810, 813 (Iowa 1999); Appellee’s Brief, supra note 422, at 10 
(quoting deposition). In addition, defense counsel later testified that Wemark suggested that if the 
knife was a problem, he could have a relative go to the house and “just get rid of it.” Appellee’s 
Brief, supra note 422, at 8 (quoting deposition) (emphasis removed). Given that they had told him 
that the evidence could not be destroyed, and that Wemark remained incarcerated, the risk that the 
evidence would be destroyed appears to have been minimal. In any event, the risk that someone else 
might remove the evidence would not change the ethical obligations of the lawyers to maintain 
confidentiality while legally advising of the criminality of destruction. 
425. Wemark, 620 N.W.2d at 813; Appellant’s Brief, supra note 421, at 4–5. 
426. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 421, at 4. 
427. Id. 
428. Id. at 5. 
429. Wemark, 602 N.W.2d at 813; Appellant’s Brief, supra note 421, at 4–5. 
430. Wemark, 602 N.W.2d at 813; Appellant’s Brief, supra note 421, at 5–6. 
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police in the basement of Wemark’s home.431 A blood analysis expert 
identified Melissa’s blood on the blade.432 
4. The Murder Trial and Guilty Verdict 
Robert Wemark’s murder case went to trial in June 1993, where it 
remained on the front page in the local newspaper from the day jury 
selection began on Monday, June 21433 through the guilty verdict on 
Thursday, July 1.434 
The case was prosecuted by Tom Miller, an Assistant Attorney 
General for the State of Iowa, who had been Attorney General until three 
years earlier when he unsuccessfully ran for Governor.435 Miller was 
elected again as Attorney General the following year and remains in that 
office today as one of the longest continuously serving state Attorneys 
General.436 Miller was assisted by Karl Knudson, the Winneshiek 
County attorney.437 
Agreeing with defense counsel that Wemark could not receive a fair 
trial in his home county, the judge had moved the trial to Fayette 
County, immediately to the south.438 Although defense counsel argued 
that the location was still too close to find an unbiased jury, the judge 
declined to move the location for a second time.439 During the trial, 
spectators in the courtroom circulated purple ribbons in apparent support 
for Melissa as a victim of domestic abuse, until Wemark’s lawyers 
objected and the judge ordered the ribbons removed in front of the 
jury.440 After the verdict had been returned, the group returned to the 
431. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 421, at 4–5. 
432. Jack Swanson, Bloody Garments Displayed in Robert Wemark Trial, OELWEIN DAILY 
REGISTER, June 28, 1993, at 1. 
433. Jack Swanson, Jury Selection for Wemark Trial Begins, OELWEIN DAILY REGISTER, June 
21, 1993, at 1. 
434. Jack Swanson, Wemark Guilty of First Degree Murder, OELWEIN DAILY REGISTER, July 2, 
1993, at 1. 
435. Jack Swanson, Court Continues Jury Selection, OELWEIN DAILY REGISTER, June 22, 1993, 
at 1. 
436. Jennifer Jacobs, Iowa Attorney General Tom Miller to Announce Re-Election Campaign, 
DESMOINESREGISTER.COM (Nov. 12, 2013), http://blogs.desmoinesregister.com/dmr/index.php/ 
2013/11/12/iowa-attorney-general-tom-miller-to-announce-re-election-campaign/article. 
437. Swanson, supra note 434, at 1. 
438. Jack Swanson, Wemark Murder Trial Moved to Fayette County, OELWEIN DAILY REGISTER, 
Apr. 20, 1993, at 1. 
439. Trial Will Stay in Fayette County, OELWEIN DAILY REGISTER, June 1, 1993, at 1. 
440. Swanson, supra note 395, at 1.  
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courtroom to pass out purple ribbons.441 
In both the opening and closing to the jury, defense counsel 
acknowledged that Robert Wemark had stabbed his wife Melissa but 
denied that it was premeditated.442 Counsel described the act as a “crime 
of passion.”443 He pointed to the fact that the crime occurred in 
Wemark’s own home in broad daylight to show that Wemark had not 
planned to kill her that day.444 The defense contended that Melissa had 
come at Wemark with the knife and that he had defended himself.445 
After that provocation, he then had gone too far and continued to stab 
her.446 The defense challenged the assertion that the knife wounds on 
Wemark’s chest were self-inflicted rather than being defensive 
wounds.447 Robert Wemark did not take the stand.448 
Prosecutor Miller contended that Robert Wemark had acted with 
malice and forethought in killing his wife.449 He observed that Wemark 
had failed to call for aid when Melissa lay dying on the floor.450 And 
then, according to the prosecutor, Wemark inflicted knife scratches on 
himself to make it appear that he had been attacked and acted in self-
defense.451 Miller referred to the threatening notes as evidence of 
malice.452 And he focused on the hiding of the knife and cleaning of the 
home as evidence of deliberation:453 “The very fact of destroying, 
altering, concealing evidence by the defendant in this case is the act of a 
man who wants that evidence to show something other than the 
truth . . . .”454 
Most importantly, prosecutor Miller emphasized that Wemark had 
stabbed his wife fifteen times, saying, “[c]ertainly before the 15th time 
441. Swanson, supra note 434, at 1. 
442. Jack Swanson, Defense Wraps Up, Jury Deliberates Over Fate, OELWEIN DAILY REGISTER, 
July 1, 1993, at 1; Swanson, supra note 393, at 1. 
443. Swanson, supra note 393, at 1. 
444. Id. 
445. Id. 
446. Id. 
447. Id. 
448. Swanson, supra note 434, at 1. 
449. Jack Swanson, State Argues for First Degree Murder Against Wemark, OELWEIN DAILY 
REGISTER, June 30, 1993, at 1. 
450. Id. 
451. Id. 
452. Swanson, supra note 442, at 1. 
453. Swanson, supra note 449, at 1; Swanson, supra note 393, at 1. 
454. Val Swinton, Wemark Murder Trial Goes to Jury, CEDAR RAPIDS GAZETTE, July 1, 1993, at 
9B. 
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he stabbed her, he knew he was taking her life.”455 During closing 
argument, Miller moved his arms up and down with the knife before the 
jury, mimicking the multiple stabbings of Melissa.456 Arguing that even 
if the “first blow was passion,” Miller re-enacted how Wemark had done 
it “again . . . and again . . . and again . . . and again.”457 
The jury deliberated for seven hours before returning a verdict of 
guilty of first degree murder on July 1, 1993.458 On August 17, 1993, 
Robert Wemark was given the mandatory sentence of life in prison 
without the possibility of parole.459 The conviction was affirmed on 
appeal.460 As of this writing, Robert Wemark remains incarcerated at the 
Anamosa State Penitentiary.461 
5. The Iowa Supreme Court’s Ruling on the Application for Post-
Conviction Relief 
After the conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, new counsel for 
Robert Wemark contended in post-conviction proceedings that Wemark 
had received ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel 
betrayed a confidential disclosure by revealing the location of the knife 
to law enforcement.462 In Wemark v. State, the Iowa Supreme Court 
confirmed the protection of privilege for matters observed by a lawyer 
based upon a client’s confidential communication, although finding the 
lawyer’s erroneous disclosure in that case to have been harmless error 
that did not justify upsetting a criminal conviction.463 
The Iowa Supreme Court agreed that “the attorney-client privilege 
protects statements by a client revealing the location of the fruits or 
instrumentality of a completed crime.”464 Along the same lines, when 
defense counsel observes real evidence in its original condition but 
“leaves the evidence alone,” the privilege prohibits revelation absent 
informed consent of the client.465 
455. Swanson, supra note 449, at 1. 
456. Swanson, supra note 442, at 1. 
457. Id. 
458. Swanson, supra note 434, at 1. 
459. Wemark Sentenced to Life, OELWEIN DAILY REGISTER, Aug. 18, 1993, at 1. 
460. Wemark v. State, 602 N.W.2d 810, 812 (Iowa 1999). 
461. IOWA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, http://www.doc.state.ia.us/InmateInfo.OffenderCd= 
1054363 (last visited Sept. 15, 2014). 
462. Wemark, 602 N.W.2d at 812. 
463. Id. at 816–18. 
464. Id. at 816. 
465. See id. at 817.  
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By disclosing this information to authorities, or effectively forcing the 
defendant to do so through mistaken counsel, defendant’s attorneys had 
acted upon the “faulty premise” that this knowledge was not 
privileged.466 In so doing, Wemark’s lawyers had breached an “essential 
duty.”467 Although acknowledging that the lawyers’ mistaken advice did 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, the Iowa Supreme Court 
concluded that no prejudice resulted given other overwhelming evidence 
of the defendant’s guilt.468 
B. Lessons Learned? 
1. Preserving Confidentiality of Location of Evidence 
The primary lesson to be learned from the Wemark case, of course, is 
that a lawyer for a criminal defendant should not reveal the location of 
real evidence to law enforcement when the location was learned through 
a confidential communication from the client.469 Unless the lawyer and 
client together decide to reveal the location for proper strategic reasons, 
or maybe if the lawyer retrieves the evidence and thus changes its 
characteristics, the location of real evidence remains privileged.470 On 
this point, the Iowa Supreme Court was adamant and unequivocal.471 
If Robert Wemark had not been encouraged to reveal the location of 
the knife to the state psychiatrist, law enforcement would never have 
found the weapon and it would never have been introduced into 
evidence at trial. To be sure, defense counsel later contended that they 
had encouraged Wemark to meet with the state psychiatrist because (1) 
there was a remote possibility that this expert would support a 
diminished capacity defense and (2) they hoped that Wemark’s candid 
disclosure might bolster his credibility later before the jury.472 But, as 
the Iowa Supreme Court recognized, these tactical considerations were a 
response to “a faulty premise,” that is, the belief by criminal defense 
counsel that they were obliged to bring about the disclosure of the 
location of the knife as real evidence.473 
466. Id. at 814–17. 
467. Id. at 815. 
468. Id. at 817. 
469. See supra Part IV.A. 
470. See supra Part IV.B. 
471. Wemark, 602 N.W.2d at 816. 
472. Appellee’s Brief at 7–10, Wemark, 602 N.W.2d 810 (No. 98-586). 
473. Wemark, 602 N.W.2d at 817. 
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Nor can we be confident that the legal error was harmless in 
Wemark’s case. Both the knife itself and Wemark’s conduct in 
affirmatively hiding it under the basement stairs became central themes 
in the prosecution’s case: 
During closing argument, the once and future state attorney general 
prosecuting the case referred to the blood analysis on the knife blade: 
“Blood on the knife. Ladies and gentlemen, the blood on the weapon 
used to take the life of Melissa Wemark [was confirmed by the 
laboratory].”474 In that closing argument, the prosecution conducted 
what Wemark’s post-conviction counsel called “a theatrical display,” in 
which he brought the knife up and down fifteen times to mimic the 
repeated stabbing of Melissa.475 
The prosecution also relied on the concealment of the knife in the 
basement as evidence that Wemark did not act from passion but behaved 
with deliberation and guilty knowledge: 
Robert Wemark hid the weapon. He didn’t toss it into the 
basement as we heard his act described a week ago. He hid it. 
He went down there and stashed it inside under that pile, hiding 
the weapon . . . . The very fact of destroying, altering, 
concealing evidence by the Defendant in this case is the act of a 
man who wants that evidence to show something other than the 
truth . . . .”476 
Now given that Wemark had stabbed his wife fifteen times, including 
multiple thrusts in the back, the prosecution’s case was compelling.477 
And the state contended that the prosecution would have mimicked the 
multiple stabbing motions, even without a knife actually being in 
evidence.478 Nonetheless, the power of the knife itself being present and 
used demonstratively cannot be denied. Moreover, its discovery in the 
basement under automobile parts allowed the prosecution to argue that 
he had deliberately concealed the weapon, indicating his guilty 
knowledge. If it had never been found by law enforcement, the parties 
and jury might well have concluded it had been heedlessly discarded 
during Wemark’s frantic travel across the state after the incident. 
And even one of the prosecutors conceded when the jury verdict was 
returned that he had harbored doubts about the likely outcome, given 
474. Appellant’s Brief at 7, Wemark v. State, 322 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir. 2003) (No. 02-1755) 
(quoting trial transcript). 
475. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 421, at 5–6. 
476. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 474, at 8 (quoting trial transcript). 
477. See supra notes 399–400 and accompanying text. 
478. Appellee’s Brief, supra note 472, at 17–18. 
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that there were “so many variables.”479 After all, the question was not 
whether Wemark would be found guilty of homicide, but rather whether 
he would be convicted of first degree murder rather than a lesser offense. 
2. Doubts About the Lawyer’s Duties Regarding Disposition of Real 
Evidence After Examination 
Suppose that the lawyers in Wemark had not stopped at simply 
observing the knife being under the basement stairs, where the client had 
said it would be located. Suppose they had taken possession of the knife 
for examination and testing. 
Wemark’s lawyer later testified at the post-conviction hearing that 
Robert Wemark was “the most patently incredible defendant that I had 
observed” in nearly two decades of practice.480 Indeed, because they 
doubted their client’s veracity, the defense lawyers went to the house in 
Ridgeway to see if the knife really was there.481 
The existence of a knife and verification that it was the actual weapon 
with which Melissa Wemark was stabbed are not one and the same. 
Even if the lawyers had seen a red smear on the blade, “visual inspection 
alone [could not establish that] the substance is human or animal blood, 
or even blood at all,” given that “paint, rust, ketchup, shoe polish, dye, 
and ink all visually resemble blood.”482 
And, of course, even assuming the red substance proved to be blood, 
the question remained as to whose blood it would prove to be. Now 
because knives are not ordinarily hidden under automotive parts in a 
basement, and this knife was precisely where Wemark said that he had 
concealed the weapon, there was no reason to doubt that it was the 
murder weapon. Still, Robert Wemark claimed that his wife had initially 
attacked him with the knife, so determining whether his blood was also 
on the blade might have bolstered that self-defense or provocation 
defense. 
The Iowa Supreme Court confirmed that the defense lawyers would 
have been well within their rights to examine the knife: “If the defense 
lawyer does not take possession of the instrument of the crime, there can 
be no opportunity to have it examined for any evidence that may be 
479. Swanson, supra note 434, at 1. 
480. Appellee’s Brief, supra note 472, at 9. 
481. Id. at 10 (quoting deposition). 
482. Uphoff, supra note 115, at 1210 & n.210 (citing ANDRE A. MOENSSENS ET AL., SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES 982–83 (5th ed. 2007)). 
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critical to the defense.”483 Immediately above in the opinion, however, 
the court had said that “a defense lawyer has no legal obligation to 
disclose information about the location of an instrument of a crime when 
possession of the instrument is not taken.”484 Thus, without saying so 
directly, the court appears to assume that, had Wemark’s counsel taken 
possession of the knife, even for examination, counsel would have been 
obliged to disclose the knife or its location afterward. 
But why? In what way would the state have been disadvantaged by 
defense counsel taking possession of the weapon for examination, 
including a forensics test for blood, followed by a return of the knife to 
its original location (that is, back under the basement stairs)? The state 
already had spent two days searching the Wemark residence. The police 
were not going to return to the house. The knife would never have been 
discovered, not because of anything done by defense counsel but 
because law enforcement had conducted an inept search, failing even to 
look in the basement of the home. 
To be sure, defense counsel might have disturbed the evidence by 
removing it, even temporarily, from the basement and by testing it for 
blood. But that situation could have been entirely ameliorated by simply 
leaving a note attached to the knife explaining that defense counsel had 
conducted forensic tests. In the unlikely event that the knife and attached 
note were later found by someone and delivered to law enforcement, 
criminal defense counsel might be obliged to confirm the testing of the 
evidence.485 In sum, returning the knife to the home, even after being 
examined, would have restored the status quo. 
A contrary rule—one that mandates disclosure of the knife to law 
enforcement after examination—means that competent counsel 
ordinarily will choose not to examine the knife under circumstances such 
as these.486 Whatever benefit to the defendant might follow from 
verifying that human blood is on the knife, and determining whose blood 
is on the blade, would likely be heavily outweighed by the damage to the 
defense through the gift to the prosecution of a weapon that it otherwise 
would not have found. 
Thus, a criminal defense lawyer should not be forced to choose 
between (1) betraying the client’s confidence by effectively disclosing 
that the client had hidden the knife in the basement or (2) forgoing the 
483. Wemark v. State, 602 N.W.2d 810, 817 (Iowa 1999). 
484. Id. 
485. See supra Part IV.B.2. 
486. See supra notes 309–310 and accompanying text. 
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important right to examine evidence for the benefit of the defense. The 
state’s interest in being alerted to the temporary possession of the knife 
by the defense (and any consequences of that temporary possession) 
could be readily protected by other means, such as a note attached to the 
returned evidence or a registry if created.487 Accordingly, a rule of 
mandatory turn-over of evidence after examination sacrifices either the 
defense prerogative to investigate the evidence or the client privilege 
against self-incrimination. As that Hobson’s choice is unnecessary, a 
rule that would create it cannot be justified on grounds of either 
professional responsibility or the constitutional rights of the accused. 
3. The Danger to Effective Assistance of Counsel Posed by 
Uncertainty on the Ethics and Law of Real Evidence 
The broader lesson to be drawn from the Wemark episode is that this 
area of legal ethics remains so opaque that veteran criminal defense 
lawyers, even after seeking advice from others, still stumble in the dark. 
As the Iowa Supreme Court reported, “[d]efense counsel were 
immediately concerned they had an ethical obligation to disclose the 
location of the knife to the prosecution. They considered nondisclosure 
to be the same as concealment and an interference with police 
investigation.”488 To say that the lawyers were mistaken is easy after the 
fact. To acknowledge that the legal system bears substantial 
responsibility for such errors is only fair. 
The misimpression that evidence must be delivered even when merely 
observed may well have been engendered by the frequently stated (and, 
in my view, mistaken) assumption that a criminal defense lawyer who 
takes possession of real evidence must thereafter altruistically deliver it 
into the hands of the prosecution.489 Legal ethics authorities must speak 
clearly and accurately to this subject, with a full evaluation of the 
professional responsibilities of the criminal defense lawyer and the 
rights to effective assistance of counsel of the criminal defendant. 
Without saying so directly, many courts and commentators appear to 
be operating under the erroneous premise that law enforcement has an 
absolute entitlement to evidence, even if its own investigation has fallen 
487. See supra Part IV.E. 
488. Wemark, 602 N.W.2d at 813. 
489. See Gillers, supra note 3, at 818 (observing that courts are mistaken when they assume that, 
because the attorney-client privilege does not attach to the thing itself, “a lawyer’s duty to deliver 
the object to authorities should necessarily follow”). For further critique of the supposed duty to 
deliver evidence to law enforcement, see supra Parts IV.B.2 & IV.E. 
 
                                                     
09 - Sisk_Final_Reviewed_By_Author.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/9/2014  8:29 PM 
898 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:819 
short and the source of that evidence is the criminal defense lawyer who 
learned of its location from the client. Unsurprisingly, these mistakes 
and misstatements lead to the deceptive apprehension that defense 
lawyers must act as agents of the government when engaging with real 
evidence. 
Witness Wemark. 
CONCLUSION 
[T]he legal responsibility imposed upon lawyers who learn of 
the existence of tangible evidence of a completed crime in the 
course of an attorney-client relationship is complex and far from 
settled. Moreover, a lawyer can be faced with a host of 
conflicting important obligations to balance, including the duty 
to preserve client confidences, investigate the case, and maintain 
an allegiance to the system of justice as an officer of the 
court.490 
Every lawyer must appreciate that this is an ever-changing area, with 
important new and expanding statutes on obstruction of justice being 
enacted and with fresh court rulings being rendered on lawyer 
responsibilities regarding real evidence. To add to the uncertainty, the 
legal obligations regarding preservation of and access to real evidence 
vary not only by the underlying area of activity involved and by the 
jurisdiction whose laws govern, but often depend as well on the 
circumstances under which the lawyer comes to have contact with the 
evidence, on the likelihood that an investigation or proceeding will 
follow, the nature of the evidence and its forensic characteristics, and 
perhaps even on the notoriety of the underlying criminal activity. 
Nor is avoidance of the difficult ethical and legal responsibilities a 
professional option, especially in the criminal defense setting. A lawyer 
should not casually take possession of potential evidence of a client 
crime. Yet the need for an independent examination of evidence to 
uphold the defendant’s constitutional right to effective assistance of 
counsel, as well as the possibility that evidence may unexpectedly be 
delivered to the lawyer, precludes absolute professional resistance to 
engaging with real evidence. 
And once evidence is in hand, or its location is known, the lawyer 
may not simply err on the side of openly revealing information and 
disclosing potential evidence. The lawyer’s duty of zealous advocacy 
and the obligation to protect client confidences direct otherwise under 
490. Wemark, 602 N.W.2d at 816.  
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some (perhaps most) circumstances. And certainly the lawyer’s 
responsibilities constrain the manner in which real evidence and the 
source of that evidence would be disclosed. 
In sum, the legal ethics of real evidence is messy, just like the real 
world in which disputes arise. As the late Judge Warren Ferguson of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit wrote, “criminal 
defense attorneys should be prepared to meet the myriad challenges of 
their vocation—investigating and uncovering disturbing evidence related 
to their representation is but one; confronting moral and ethical 
dilemmas competently is another.”491 
But prosecutors and judges should not be adding to those difficulties 
by threatening zealous criminal defense lawyers with criminal charges or 
by failing to clarify the rightly robust protections for criminal defendants 
and their counsel. Under the current draft for revision of the American 
Bar Association’s Standards for Criminal Justice, defense counsel are 
directed to “competently advise the client about lawful options and 
obligations,” after “examin[ing] the specific law of the jurisdiction on 
topics such as obstruction of justice, tampering with evidence, and 
privileges protecting the client’s confidentiality and against self-
incrimination.”492 But, as this Article seeks to demonstrate, the 
confusion of the law in this field is a scandal to our profession, impeding 
such competent advising of clients. And criminal defense lawyers, 
fearing a hostile response by prosecutors, are too often inhibited in 
diligent representation of individuals who face investigation and 
prosecution by those same prosecutors. 
The consequences of sloppiness in articulation of the ethical regime 
for real evidence are real. Thoughtful academics and experienced 
lawyers who reviewed earlier drafts of this Article frequently remarked 
that most criminal lawyers would steer clear of the problems described 
in these hypotheticals, regarding acceptance of such cases as too risky 
for the lawyer. And yet clients facing such perilous situations are 
precisely those who most need conscientious and committed legal 
counsel. 
We should insist that professional, bar, legislative, and judicial 
authorities act to clarify the rules and guidelines. Lawyers are being 
chilled from zealous representation as much by the continuing ambiguity 
of the constraints as by the constraints themselves. I hope that the 
foregoing offers assistance to some intrepid defense lawyers and 
491. McClure v. Thompson, 323 F.3d 1233, 1254 (9th Cir. 2003) (Ferguson, J., dissenting). 
492. Proposed Revision to Standard 4-4.7(a), supra note 124. 
 
                                                     
09 - Sisk_Final_Reviewed_By_Author.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/9/2014  8:29 PM 
900 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:819 
challenges to others in our criminal justice system. I hope I have 
advanced the discussion one small step forward toward a clearer 
resolution. In an era of encroaching law and expanding federal criminal 
liability, sometimes without the explicit protection of a meaningful mens 
rea requirement, the ethical problems for lawyers engaging with real 
evidence are likely to increase and magnify in the coming years. 
 
 
